אמת ואמונה

REASON *and* FAITH,

OR,

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSURDITIES,

AND THE

NECESSITY *of* REVELATION,

INTENDED TO

Promote FAITH *among* INFIDELS,

AND THE

Unbounded Exercise of HUMANITY *among all* RELIGIOUS MEN.

By one of the SONS *of* ABRAHAM *to his* BRETHREN.

דע מה שתשיב לאפיקורוס

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BRITISH MUSEUM

PREFACE AND DEDICATION.

To the worthy Gentlemen Subſcribers to the Printing of this Work.

DEAR brethren, this little work owes its birth to the deſire I had for the happineſs of a youth, fearing that he would be perverted by productions under the honourable titles of Modern Philoſophers, who deſtroy all principles of faith and virtue, I have ventured to attack thoſe great men, in a ſtile adapted to his comprehenſion, and in a language which I am confident you underſtand much better than I can write. You will certainly excuſe the improprieties you will find in it, unavoidable in a foreigner who learned the Engliſh language, without a maſter,

maſter, in his old age; neither do I expect to give the ſatisfaction I could wiſh in every thing I ſhall offer; but I hope you will allow that it is eaſier to ſtart difficulties than to ſolve them, notwithſtanding ſhould it be found that, againſt my intention, I may have advanced any thing amiſs, from this moment I diſavow it, for I warrant nothing of all that I ſhall ſay, but the right and purity of my intention which I expreſſed in the title page.

Metaphyſics is an abſtruſe ſcience, obſcured with technical terms of no determined ſignification; I have avoided them as much as poſſible, and have treated the ſubject in the plaineſt manner I was able; and, though it never was intended to be publiſhed, it is my duty to thank you, Gentlemen, for having found it not only deſerving publication, but for printing it at your own coſt, and I hope that it may contribute to the benefit and improvement of our youth, for whom it is only intended, which is the ſincere wiſh of,

Dear Brethren,

Your moſt humble Servant,

The AUTHOR.

THE

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ERRATA.

PAGE.	3,	Line	16,	for *science*, read *faculties*.
——	31,	——	21,	for *bears*, read *implies*.
——	67,	——	1,	for *can*, read *which*.
——	77,	——	15,	for 17*th*, read 15*th*.
——	78,	——	20,	for *seperate*, read *separate*.
——	80,	——	7,	for *joke*, read *yoke*.
——	82,	——	21,	after *Gods*, add *full of vices*.
——	10[illegible],	——	[illegible],	for *say*, read *says*.
——	114,	——	3,	for *succession after succession*, read *generation after generation*.
——	,	——	4,	for *progression*, read *succession*.
——	120,	——	7,	for *vehatiel*, read *vehaziel*.
——	134,	——	4,	after *only*, add *to*.

☞ These I have found, besides several letters missing which do not appear, with other faults that have been overlooked, which the reader will be pleased to correct.

Of PHILOSOPHY *and its* ABSURDITIES.

Nihil tam abſurdum dici poteſt quod non
Dicatur ab aliquo Philoſophorum. CICERO.

THE great wonders of nature have naturally excited the curioſity of mankind to enquire into their cauſes; but as thoſe could only be ſought after, but not fully found, Pythagoras thought the name of Sophos, which the ancients took, was too preſumptuous, and very properly changed it into that of *Philoſophos*, believing the knowledge of men too trifling to be called wiſe, but only lovers of wiſdom.

Of the truth of which, being the firſt of the *Philoſophers*, he gave us the moſt early proof; for though he taught Aſtronomers the motion of the earth, and adminiſtered ſome very good leſſons of morality, his philoſophy was, notwithſtanding, full of ſuperſtition and abſurdities; it is ſufficient to

know, that it is ſaid of him, he cauſed an ox to ſpring out of a field of beans, which ſpoke; that he could foretell what was to come; and that he was ſeen in two places at the ſame time.

Anaxagoras; after him, found out by the wonders of nature the exiſtence of a Supreme Being; but believed the Rock ſtones found in ſeveral places to be fallen ſtars, and that the ſun was a burning ſtone.

Socrates, who followed him, promulgated moral philoſophy, the only philoſophy he thought deſerving to be called by that name; deſpiſed the natural philoſophy of Anaxagoras; believed like him in the Supreme Being, and was condemned to die for introducing the ſame truth among his ſcholars; but believed alſo, he had a demon who inſpired him, and ordered before his death, that a cock which he had promiſed to Eſculapius ſhould be offered him.

Plato and Diogenes the cynic, his diſciples, were much more abſurd; Plato the divine, by mixing the Philoſophy of Pythagoras,

goras, and that of Socrates, with his own confuſed ideas, pretended to explain what he did not underſtand; ſaid, let there be light, and behold all was darkneſs.

Diogenes, called with propriety the cynic, for living more like a dog than a man, maintained that all that was natural was good, and what was good ought not to cauſe ſhame; and by conſequence every man may ſhew his nakedneſs, and do what ever is natural in every public place, and turn himſelf by his philoſophy from a man into a beaſt.

Ariſtotle, Plato's ſcholar, who acquired a great deal of learning, found out the ſureſt way to explain the cauſes of every thing, by his occult ~~ſcience~~ facultes; that is by faculties unknown to him and to every body elſe.

Epicurus, ſo much celebrated amongſt the Theiſts or modern philoſophers, not knowing the ſun moved round the world, or the world round the ſun, aſſerted that he ſaw the ſun flying from Mount Ida, every night from weſt to eaſt, to return to his journey every morning.

All which, confirms the aforementioned lines from Cicero, that " we can ſay nothing ſo abſurd but we ſhall find it ſaid by one or other of the philoſophers." But who would think that the truth of this aſſertion will hold even in the preſent civilized age, when the world is ſo much older, when learning is ſo much encreaſed, and when long experience has been the guide of our philoſophers.

Who would imagine that in our time the name of philoſopher is ſo much degraded; that it is not, now a days, he who ſtudies morality; not he who makes the analyſis of things and finds out their principles or their true reſolvents; not, he who learns us to meaſure the *earth* and to determine its figure; to diſcover the courſe of the planets, and to calculate their conjunctions and eclipſes; not he who teaches us navigation, and all the other uſeful and inſtructive arts.

A philoſopher, now a days, is he who declares that a man ought to believe nothing but what he ſees and has a certain and poſi-

tive

tive knowledge of; who denies providence, and laughs at faith and revelation; who is bound by no other than the civil laws, and is a ſubſtitute of what we formerly called an heretic, or infidel; it is not a Newton, a Leibnitz, a Huygens, a Clerc, a Bacon, a Boerhave, or a Nieventyd; it is a Spinoſa, a Collins, a Tindal, a Bollingbroke, a Hume, or a Voltaire.

Thus that venerable name of philoſopher is miſapplied, and ignorant youth deceived, by believing themſelves philoſophers, ſo ſoon as they become unbelievers: This induced me to write the following eſſay, to ſhew the abſurdities of thoſe philoſophers, who, though they can believe nothing but what they ſee, and can underſtand, they aſſert, ſeveral times, what they cannot know nor are able to explain; and their principles are not only not certain, but even not probable, and many only mere abſurdities.

I deſire it only to be obſerved, that all along, when I mention modern philoſophers; I mean only the atheiſts, deiſts, and unbelievers, not the inquirers after true and uſeful wiſdom.

SECTION

Section II.

Of BELIEF.

BELIEF is the firſt ſtumbling block of the unbelievers; accordingly they have made a definition of belief only ſuited to their purpoſe, and againſt the belief of all reaſonable men.

"We believe a thing (ſays Mr. W——) "becauſe we ſee it, perceive it, or under- "ſtand it. The art of believing what is a- "bove our comprehenſion, and not contrary "to it, is a ſophiſm and a mere jingling of "words; we cannot ſay in truth that we be- "lieve farther than we underſtand." And upon the ſame principle, another ſays, "That "belief and diſbelief cannot be a virtue or a "crime, for if a propoſition is evident we "cannot avoid believing it, and where is the "merit of a neceſſary aſſent? if it is not "evident we cannot help rejecting it, and "where is the crime of not believing, what "does not appear to us to be true."

But

But does not this true conſequence, drawn from the definition of belief, ſhew the abſurdity of that definition? Let us retort this argument; there muſt be a merit in believing and a crime in diſbelieving; *ergo*, belief or diſbelief cannot be a neceſſary aſſent or diſſent.

Would not a man be laughed at, who ſhould ſay, I believe that I exiſt, or when eating or walking, I believe I am walking, or am eating; conſequently, belief is not in things which are clear, evident, and underſtood by every body, but in thoſe that are not ſo; no man will ſay, I believe, that two and two is four; though he may ſay, I believe that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, while he has only that notion from the aſſertion of men, whom he believes, and to whoſe abilities he truſts; but as ſoon as he has gone through the operation, as ſoon as he, by the intermediate and parallel lines, is convinced that the alternate angles muſt be equal, and ſo likewiſe the outward and inward oppoſite ones on the ſame ſide, he will not expreſs himſelf by I

believe,

believe, but he will positively affirm that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; for no mathematician would express himself by saying that he *believes*, but that he *knows* it.

Consequently, belief is never applied in things self evident, and clearly understood, but knowledge; and therefore there can be neither merit or criminality in the certain and evident knowledge of a thing; but when a thing is not self-evident, and the comprehension of it is above my reason, I believe, because I think a man will not deceive me, and because I believe every man ought to be credited when he has no interest to impose upon me until he is found out to be a cheat; and in that case, there is certainly a merit in believing, and an ill will in not believing.

Now if that is the case, even in things that come from one man to another, would it not be a greater crime to disbelieve what, a multitude of men affirm, comes from God who cannot err? and that, not because it is against reason, but because we have not seen it or we cannot comprehend it; even if what

we

we believe ſhould happen to prove falſe, and that belief ſhould be enforced upon us by the *fear* or *love* of God, that is, by the fear of diſpleaſing God, who might poſſibly have commanded it, or by the love and gtatitude we owe to him, there is, and muſt be a merit in the motive of our belief.

If we are to believe nothing but what we ſee and clearly underſtand, as the aforeſaid Philoſophers pretend, we ought not to believe that the loadſtone draws the iron, nor in any other attraction whatſoever, becauſe though we ſee it, we cannot underſtand it.

And by the ſame way of reaſoning no man ought to believe the Sun and Moon larger than a table plate, nor the Stars bigger than a ſhilling, becauſe it is in this manner they ſee them, and only underſtand their magnitude: And laſtly, none of thoſe Philoſophers ought to believe in God, becauſe they cannot ſee him, nor comprehend him; which, whatever they may pretend to ſay, to avoid the diſgrace which attends the name of Atheiſt, muſt be truly the conſequence of their wretched philoſophy.

Section III.

Of G O D.

THOUGH this kind of Philoſophers pretend that we cannot believe what we do not ſee and do not underſtand, and though it is evident God can neither be ſeen nor comprehended; King David who was wiſer than any of them ſays, *The Fool ſays in his heart there is no God*, calling the Atheiſt a fool, for none but thoſe who are void of common ſenſe, can deny the exiſtence of God.

The exiſtence of a Deity, tho' we cannot ſee it nor comprehend it, is not only as evident as any *Mathematical demonſtration* which is learned with trouble, and never comprehended by the illiterate, but as clear and evident as the *firſt principles, or axioms*; the truth of which is obtained almoſt by intuition, as, that the whole is greater than a part, and that if you take two equal parts from two equal things, their remainders will be equal; the truth of which is clear and diſtinct to the conception of every

man

man, and he muſt not only be a fool, but an idiot, who denies it.

But a man's own exiſtence is certainly yet more evident to him than any of the aforeſaid axioms. If a man does not know or is not conſcious of his own exiſtence, he muſt certainly not only be a fool, but he muſt have loſt all thought and ſenſation.

Let us ſuppoſe he believes himſelf only a machine, or a piece of clock work (as ſome of theſe philoſophers endeavour to make us believe we are) if he cannot perceive, that he is at leaſt a very wonderful machine which ſurpaſſes any one he ever ſaw, he certainly muſt be a *fool*, and if he believes that his father, who perhaps was as aukward as never to be able with the greateſt application to make a ſpit in the day light, could work a machine like himſelf in the dark, without knowing what he was about, he muſt alſo certainly be a *fool*, and by conſequence his own exiſtence will bring him to a knowledge that there muſt be another cauſe of his being, a cauſe that is able and has

knowledge

knowledge to form ſuch a machine, which cauſe endowed with ſuch wiſdom and power is what we call GOD.

Farther, if he does not know that hands were given him to feel, legs to walk, eyes to ſee, and ears to hear, &c. he muſt certainly be *a fool*; and if he cannot help ſeeing a deſign in this, he muſt as by intuition, believe not only that there was a cauſe, but that there was *goodneſs*, *power* and *wiſdom* in the cauſe who gave him thoſe ſenſes.

Then it is evident that God has made known his exiſtence, his wiſdom, his power, and his goodneſs, more diſtinct and clearer to every man's capacity, than that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, which tho' true and demonſtrable, is not ſo diſtinctly apprehended, nor ſo eaſily to be underſtood by every man.

True it is that a learned man will find farther demonſtrations; an Anatomiſt will diſcover a thouſand deſigns in the ſtructure only of one eye, in its muſcles, in its membranes, in its tunics, in its humours, in its nerves,

nerves, in its veins and arteries, &c. and above a million of deſigns in the formation, ſituation, connexion, order and figure of all the bones, muſcles, glands, membranes, nerves, tendons, veins, arteries and valves, &c. of the whole body, and will like David amazed exclaim, *All my bones declare who is like thee O Lord!* and *ſee* (like Job) *the true God from his fleſh*; if he looks on high, he will ſurely and evidently behold *the Heavens declare the Glory of God*, he will by the number, magnitude, regularity, ſituation, order, and motion of the heavenly bodies, by the almoſt infinite ſyſtems of worlds, diſcover infinite power, infinite wiſdom, and infinite goodneſs.

Theſe are demonſtrations to the learned, which require ſtudy and application like the mathematical propoſitions, and will prove not only the ſimple power, wiſdom, and *goodneſs* of the FIRST CAUSE, but his omnipotence, his omniſcience, his infinite goodneſs, his immenſity, and his perfection. Whoſe exiſtence, power, wiſdom and beneficence,

ficence, are ſo clear and evident to the meaneſt capacity, that I, like King David, muſt call an Atheiſt, *an arrant fool*, who believes there can be effect without cauſe, motion without motive power, deſign without wiſdom, and that either nothing could produce itſelf into ſomething, or that never any thing was created.

Section IV.

Of ATHEISM *and* IDOLATRY.

BUT if the exiſtence of God, his power and wiſdom are ſo clear to men, as to ſpring neceſſarily out of the conſciouſneſs of their own exiſtence, how came (will thoſe Gentlemen aſk) there to be in the world Idolaters and Atheiſts? I anſwer, that both originated from the ſame principle, that abſurd one, of not believing any thing but what is clearly ſeen and underſtood.

Men in their ſavage ſtate could not avoid, either by revelation given to the firſt man, as we ſhall ſhew in its place, or by ſelf conviction,

viction, of believing in a Deity; but as their rude and weak minds could not conceive a being that is not ſeen, nor can be comprehended, they began to look for that being in all viſible things, in plants, in inſects, in beaſts, in men, in the ſun, moon, and all the planets, and thus their worſhip commenced not by not having the conviction of God, but by miſapplying the God of their conviction, for *the ſavages were never Atheiſts.*

But ſome of thoſe Philoſophers, who, not by the weakneſs of their minds, but by the perverſion of their reaſon, became ſo far ſavages as to aſſert like them, that nothing could be believed which was not ſeen and underſtood, as they did not chuſe to be idolaters, they have become worſe in becoming Atheiſts; for whatever Mr. Bayle may pretend to ſay, "that a country which denies its allegiance to its legitimate King, is not ſo rebellious as that which places another in his room;" it is far beyond diſpute, that he who pleads for *anarchy* is worſe than he who eſta-

bliſhes

bliſhes a *bad government*; and that a bad king, which is the ſituation of the idolaters, is not ſo bad as no King at all, which is that of the Atheiſts.

Section V.

Of EVIL.

THE unbelievers have exerted their utmoſt efforts and racked their underſtandings to accumulate all the evils and diſorders found in this world; and to what end? to puzzle the minds of men, and to make them, if poſſible, reject their own conviction.

One of them (D. H.) though I do not recollect his proper words, ſays in ſubſtance that if in men the knowledge of God ſhould precede the knowledge of the diſorders of nature, we ſhould not, nor ought to retract our former belief for the ſake of this difficulty, but we ought to ſolve it in the beſt manner we can, or to acknowledge it is above our underſtanding; but in men he ſays it is otherwiſe, we know God only by his effects, &c.

But

But I would aſk him what he knew before? The exiſtence of God, or the diſorders of nature? He will certainly not ſay the laſt, becauſe that would be a plain confeſſion that he never believed in God, nor could I believe him if he ſhould ſay it, for the exiſtence and goodneſs of God, ſprings as we have ſeen, from the conſciouſneſs of our own exiſtence, which precedes any thing elſe in the world. But the conſideration of the evils and diſorders therein, to draw from them any argument not conſiſtent with the Supreme Being, cannot come but after too much reflection, and after ſuch a certain kind of learning as that of the aforeſaid philoſopher.

Of the truth of this we are convinced by experience, for of a thouſand who *believe* in God, hardly one is puzzled with that difficulty, and conſequently, as the exiſtence of God and his goodneſs precedes every thing, by his own way of reaſoning, we ought not to retract our belief, but if we cannot explain it, we ought to believe it is above our underſtandings.

But Lactantius makes Epicurus form a ſtronger argument; either, ſays he, God could remove evil out of this world, and would not, which is ill will; or he would, and could not, which is want of power; or neither could nor would, which is worſe; or he could and would, which can only be ſaid of God, with propriety; but if God can, and is willing, how is there evil in the world?

This argument, which has greatly perplexed the Antient as well as the Modern Philoſophers, and made ſome of them conceive very fooliſh notions of God, either that there were two Gods, one good and one bad, as Manes pretended, or no God at all, as the Atheiſts deſire, for a good God cannot create evil; this difficulty, I ſay, proceeded from the abſurdity of miſtaking the relation of things for their identity; *good and bad*, or good and evil, are as *great and ſmall*; not beings created, but neceſſary relations of beings.

No created being is good or bad eſſentially, as none can be ſaid to be eſſentially great or ſmall, but by compariſon; the ſame thing may be great and very great compared to one thing, as an elephant to a mite, and very ſmall compared to another, as the ſame elephant to the whole globe, or this globe to the ſun; ſo every thing in this world is either good in compariſon to one, or an evil in compariſon to another.

If a bird ſwallows a caterpillar, it is an evil to the caterpillar, but a good to the bird; if a hawk ſwallows the bird, it is an evil to the bird, but a good to the hawk. To aſk if fire, water or air, are good or bad, is the ſame abſurdity as to aſk if they are *great or ſmall.*

Nothing in itſelf can be either good or bad, great or ſmall, but by compariſon, and therefore they may be at the ſame time one and the other. Fire is a good when it adminiſters to our uſe, but an evil when it burns our property; ſo is water a good when it quenches our thirſt, and an evil

when it drowns us; air likewiſe is very good to preſerve our lives by reſpiration, but very bad when it grows into a ſtorm; ſo is bread when it feeds and maintains us a good, but when by intemperance or exceſs it hurts us it muſt be an evil; ſo is a knife, a ſaw, a pin, a needle, &c. a good or an evil according to the circumſtances; the ſun (ſaid the bleacher) is good becauſe it whitens my linen, but an evil becauſe it burns my face; the rain is an evil to the traveller, at the ſame time that it is a great good to the planter.

Who can doubt but that the gift of ſpeech, and the arts of writing, printing, navigation, &c. are very good, notwithſtanding they are alſo the cauſe of many evils, of ſlander, of forgery, of perverting by bad books the minds of good people, and of many periſhing in the ſea. The invention of gun-powder was to all appearances a great evil, notwithſtanding it has ſaved many lives.

Nothing

Nothing then can be ſuſceptible of good that is not ſuſceptible of evil alſo; to expect that God would create fire that it ſhould roaſt our meat but not burn our fleſh; that the rain ſhould moiſten the earth but not wet the traveller; that man ſhould be liable to pleaſure and not to pain; is the ſame as to expect that man ſhould have deſires without wants, that he ſhould be ſenſible and not ſenſible; that he ſhould ſatisfy his appetite without being hungry, and his thirſt, without being liable to drought, which is as impoſſible in the fitneſs of things, as it is *to be*, and *not to be* at the ſame time.

In the ſituation of things what we call *evil* is as neceſſary as a *fever to a man*, which is an effort of nature to expel ſome peccant humour from the body. If there were no ſtorms the air would be ſtagnated and peſtilence would rage; if the fire in the bowels of the earth did not find a vent and cauſe ſome times thoſe frightful Earthquakes, it might perhaps cauſe the deſtruction of the whole world.

Beſides,

Beſides, what evil is it to the material world, if the ſea, for example, covers one part of it by inundations, and leaves another dry; to the world it is neither good nor evil. Good and evil are only relative to men, and as men they could not enjoy one without being liable to the other. Socrates would never have known the pleaſure of being releaſed from his chains, had he never worn them, and men could never know what was pleaſure without having wants, and being liable to pain.

To be an animal and not a ſtone is certainly a good; now to enjoy the pleaſure of ſenſation, and not feel either want or pain, is to pretend that a thing ſhould be at the ſame time ſenſible and not ſenſible, which is a contradiction.

Bad and good was put in the ſame tree by Moſes, to teach philoſophers that one could not exiſt without the other. If matter could poſſibly be only good and not bad, matter ſhould be God, for God alone is the utmoſt and pure good; he only is perfection itſelf.

If

If matter is not God, it is for its imperfections, and conſequently muſt be liable to bad and good.

But (ſay they) could God not create Men without paſſions, when we find thoſe paſſions ſo deſtructive even to men themſelves. I boldly anſwer no, as it is impoſſible in the fitneſs of things; as it is *to be a man*, and *not a man*, at the ſame time.

Section VI.

Of PASSIONS.

WHAT is Paſſion? The reſult of our ſenſibility, the effect of our pains and pleaſures. There is no pain to which a deſire of relief is not annexed; there is no pleaſure but with a deſire of continuation. Our wants are only the cauſe of our pains, and our enjoyments of our pleaſures; theſe wants and deſires either may be immediately relieved or ſatisfied, or the ſatisfaction may be far off. If the want is preſent, it is called *pain*, if far off, it is *fear*;

if

if the relief is preſent, it is *pleaſure*, if far off it is *hope*, if there was no want, that is, if there was no pain there would be no deſire of relief, and by conſequence no pleaſure; there would be neither fear nor hope, there would be no ſenſations, and there would be no man.

Now paſſions are nothing elſe but deſires produced by our wants for relief, and as men are liable to many wants, they muſt conſequently be ſuſceptible of many deſires, if theſe deſires are immoderate we call them paſſions, if the deſire of ſatisfying one want prevails upon all the others we call it the prevailing paſſion.

Reaſon is given to man to regulate his paſſions, to rule and moderate his deſires, and what is reaſon? but the ſame mind that deſires without reflexion, to remain in ſuſpence a while, to judge, to compare abſtract and abſent ideas, and to accumulate future fears, to ſtop and remove the cravings of thoſe deſires, in theſe, as we ſhall ſee, by and by, conſiſt the liberty of men.

If

If there were no wants in man, there would be no desires; if there were no desires there would be no passions, which are only immoderate desires; but if a man had no hunger nor thirst, he would never care to nourish himself, and he would perish; and as Plato and the Rabbins have proved, by a beautiful fable, if a man had no stimulation, he would not propagate his own kind; and likewise, if he had no emulation he never would be industrious; then it is not the desire which hurts men, but the excess, which we call passion.

Intemperance, lasciviousness, envy, &c. are nothing else than the excess of the aforementioned desires; not moderated by reason, that is, by a man being unwilling to call to mind, to compare, and to judge, between absent and present ideas, which would convince him of the danger of excess.

There is nothing more absurd than to suppose that a man could be created without passions, for such a one would be a man without being susceptible of pain or pleasure,

of deſire, of hope, or fear, and he would be no man.

So it is not God who created deſtructive paſſions in man, but it is man himſelf, who, by having the liberty to uſe his reaſon, to ſubdue the exceſs of his deſires, which deſires are neceſſary for his good and preſervation, and not uſing the ſame, creates and is guilty of thoſe exceſſes.

Exceſs in every thing is certainly an evil, but if this ſhould be an evil created by God, nothing that God created could be good, for there is nothing ſo good that by exceſs could not be made an evil; bread, water, clothes, all pleaſures, and the moſt deſirable things, are made by exceſs evils, and great evils, and conſequently it would follow, there could be no good in the world; which would be the greateſt abſurdity.

But, they will aſk, is not a man forced to act by his paſſions, by his deſires, by his motives or reaſons? Is not a man compelled by neceſſity? Is free-will not a chimera? No.

SECTION.

Section VII.

Of FREE-WILL.

THE neceſſity of the will is another ſtrong hold of thoſe philoſophers, which they have fortified with fatality, immutable laws of God, concatenation of cauſes and effects, &c. to defend themſelves from the aſſaults of remorſe, and to throw the load of their own guilt upon Him, who, by his unſpeakable perfection, muſt be void of every guilt.

A will that is not free is an abſurdity. By will we not only underſtand the power of *willing*, but alſo of *not willing* a thing; now by a neceſſary will, either we muſt underſtand the common neceſſity that is in every thing, which is to be what they are; and thus a will muſt by neceſſity will or not will, which is the ſame as ſaying that a volition muſt be a volition, as matter muſt be matter, which knowledge every man has, without the help of philoſophy, for the moſt

ſtupid fellow will aſcertain that a horſe muſt be a horſe.

Or by a neceſſary will, we ought to believe that the will, which is a power not only to will, but not to will a thing, has not this power, which is not only abſurd but contradictory; and conſequently if the will may as well will as not will a thing, it muſt by neceſſity be free.

Neceſſity implies compulſion, conſtraint, or reſtraint; ſome force that comes from abroad, from an agent which forces the thing forced; but who forces my will, to will or not to will? you anſwer, my deſires, my paſſions, my ideas, my motives; in one word, the reſult of my judgment, for there is no effect without a cauſe.

But who puts my judgment to work? It is ſurely my will; I am in ſuſpence, I am in doubt if it will conduce to my happineſs to gratify the call of my deſires, I do not know what to reſolve, I am perhaps in doubt if I ſhall move or ſtand ſtill, I ſurely muſt do one or the other, there is the neceſ-

ſity,

ſity, but I am in doubt which of the two is the beſt, I put my judgment to work, becauſe I am willing to certify myſelf; I call to mind ſeveral ideas, I am willing to compare them together, I determine what I think the beſt, and that is my will; thus my will is as much the cauſe of my judgment, as my judgment is the cauſe of my determination.

But how can two things be both at the ſame time cauſe and effect of one another? Becauſe, in reality, they are neither cauſe nor effect. The perception, deſire, memory, judgment, and will, are not different *beings* who work one upon the other, as cauſe and effect, they are faculties of the ſame being, connected together in the mind, as the eyes and the noſe in the human body, or as the three humours in the eye, which all together are the inſtruments of ſight in the eye, and ſo are the others of will in the ſoul, without being either cauſe or effect of one another.

Nothing can force the will, becauſe nothing can force the mind; a man may be

locked

locked up in a room, may be chained and fixed to a place, and yet he may have the will to go, or not to go abroad.

It is so far that any desire, motive, idea, or judgment, which all come under the denomination of thought, by which a will is determined; it is so far I say, from forcing the will, that only in this consists its freedom, "Wheresoever thought is wanting, "says the great Locke, or the power to act "or forbear according to the direction of "the thought, there necessity takes place; "agents that have no thought or volition, "are necessary agents."

If it was not so, none but mad men would have free-will, for they only will without motive or judgment; and by this principle a man who should murder another through motives of anger, resentment, or desire of revenge, would be acquitted of guilt at the tribunal of those philosophers, because he could not avoid the commission of the crime if he was forced by his motives; it is only the madman who murders another without motive

motive or judgment that they could find guilty, and condemn, for he acted with free-will.

This and other abſurdities would be the conſequence of the refined way of reaſoning of thoſe pretended philoſophers, by taking, as cauſe and effect, what is neither the one nor the other; by denying that the ſoul is a being, and by making a being of every one of its faculties, to act like agents, one on the other. The ſoul or mind, which animates the man, is a being endowed with ſelf-motion; where there is ſelf-motion there is no cauſe, but the FIRST CAUSE of all things; this is who gives ſelf-motion to man, who gives him ſenſation, deſire, and thought, which is what conſtitutes the freedom of his will.

If a man, as we find him, is not free, I would aſk thoſe philoſophers, if it was impoſſible to God to give freedom to men? They cannot ſay it was, for a free man implies no contradiction; then let them, if they can, deſcribe to us in what manner a man ſhould be otherwiſe than he is, to be free, and I will grant

grant them that a man, as he is now conſtituted, is not free.

Beſides, we find freedom in men even where there can be neither motive, choice, or deſire; ſuppoſe I ſhould tell a man to cloſe all his fingers, except one, there is no choice, preference, motive, or deſire, that forces him to prefer one finger to all the others, and the refuge of the philoſophers, who want to perſuade us that the motive is the deſire of ſhewing his liberty, cannot be even admitted in the preſent caſe; for that motive is only in me who orders, not in him who obeys, as he even is ignorant of the motive of my deſire.

If the will was conſtrained there would be no more merit in giving my purſe to a poor man than if he forced it out of my pocket; one would be as much the effect of neceſſity as the other, which any man is free to believe, becauſe he is free to will the greateſt abſurdity.

But, you may ſay, what ſignifies if the will is free or not, if the *laws of nature*, or the immutable

immutable laws of God, neceſſity, fatality, the concatenation of cauſes and effects, and even *the foreſight or preſcience of God* muſt compel the man to whatever he does or acts, muſt make him a neceſſary agent and not a free being? But let us examine the powers of this great battery, one by one, and we ſhall ſoon diſcover their weakneſs.

Section VIII.

LAWS *of* NATURE.

THE laws of nature, by which all created beings are regulated, and are to obey by neceſſity, would prove the neceſſity of mens actions, if ſuch laws were not a chimera forged in the brains of thoſe philoſophers; the abſurdity of which will appear in the definition of theſe two words; *law* is the expreſſion of a will; *nature* is no being, but only, if it means any thing, can mean thoſe eſſential properties by which each thing is what it is.

The nature of plants is to vegetate, and that of animals to have ſenſation, ſelf-motion,

tion, and thought; now the *laws of nature* in the proper literal ſenſe of the term, can ſignify nothing elſe, than *the expreſſion of the will of the eſſential properties of things, by which they are what they are*; which is mere nonſenſe.

But a philoſopher, ſay theſe modern ſages, ought not to have recourſe for every thing to the will of God! But who elſe, except an omnipotent and all-wiſe Creator, could have given thoſe properties to every being? God only exiſts by neceſſity as the Firſt Cauſe, of which all the reſt, in all the ſyſtems of the univerſe, are only the effect; God has infinite power and wiſdom; nature is no being, has neither wiſdom nor power, and conſequently the *laws*, or *will*, of *nature*, are expreſſions conveying a philoſophical abſurdity, which philoſophers have ſubſtituted, inſtead of the true intelligible expreſſion, *the will of God*.

But how can we know the will of God? Only by what experience ſhews us, in the nature of things; the will of God muſt be that plants ſhall vegetate, becauſe we ſee they

they grow, that animals ſhall be ſenſible, becauſe we find they have ſenſation; and by the ſame reaſon, we muſt believe that the will of God, is that men ſhould be free, and not forced to be good or bad, becauſe we ſee them free, and becauſe it would be againſt the goodneſs of God, to *will*, or *force* them *to be wicked*.

SECTION IX.

Of the IMMUTABLE LAWS *of* GOD *in* NATURE.

GOD, ſay the aforeſaid philoſophers, has made immutable laws; men and all nature are compelled to be what they are; and as a ſtone by thoſe laws, muſt always gravitate to the centre of the world, ſo the will of men muſt obey thoſe laws, which God implanted in their nature; thoſe laws were given by God, which he can neither alter nor aboliſh.

But God has not ſurely *revealed* this to theſe philoſophers? for thoſe which I am

contending with, do not believe in revelation: But how then came they by this knowledge? By experience, they anſwer, we find them in nature, and we have found them always conſtant and the ſame; the ſtones we ſee always fall to the earth, the planets approximate towards the ſun, the plants grow, but do not walk; brutes walk, but do not converſe; and man reaſons and dies.

But could not God ſuſpend, for ſome time, a law of his own making? "No, anſwers boldly a philoſopher," "it cannot be that "the infinitely wiſe Being ſhould make "laws and afterwards break them," if, ſays he, "he made any alteration in his machine, "it would be to make it go the better; now "it is clear that God has framed this im-"menſe machine as good as it poſſibly could "be; beſides, God can do nothing with-"out reaſon; now what reaſon could in-"duce him to diſfigure his machine?"

But has not God a free will? Is there any law that can bind him? Has not God grant-

ed

ed life to men for a term of years, and to the Ephemera only for one day? Is it neceſſary for a thing that is, *to be for ever?* Cannot God who created the world at any time annihilate it? Shall he who made the ſun go not be able to make it ſtop? A man who propoſes to give another a certain ſum of money for a ſtipulated time, does he alter his mind, when after the expiration of the time he does not continue the loan? No; he rather confirms it. Does God alter his mind becauſe the moon changes her faces? Who has told theſe philoſophers that God has bound himſelf by laws, and immutable laws?

But why ſhould God deprive himſelf of one of his moſt perfect attributes, that of his liberty and freedom? To ſay that God is not free to act, only a madman can aſſert; and this abſurdity would neceſſarily follow, from his binding himſelf from all eternity by immutable laws; if God gave nature to things, as he gave life to men, to hold it at his pleaſure and will; is there any alteration

in

in God, in performing things agreeable to his own will?

It is true God framed his machine as good as poſſible, but who told thoſe Gentlemen that the machine was as good as poſſible without thoſe changes? It is not always the beſt what is conſtantly the ſame; a Watch-maker who could make a watch which would follow the irregularities of the ſun, would be a greater artificer, than he who could only make it go regularly four and twenty hours every day.

Conſequently to ſuppoſe that the omniſcient, omnipotent, and free-acting Being, is governed or ſubjected to laws which he cannot alter, when he pleaſes, is ſuch an abſurdity, that it deſerves no other anſwer, to thoſe who inſiſt upon it, but the mad-houſe.

Now if God is governed by no laws, but only governs by his will and pleaſure, except we prove, that it is againſt his will and pleaſure, that men ſhould be free, there can be no other laws that can force the will of men.

SECTION

SECTION X.

Of FATALITY, NECESSITY, *and* CONCATENATION *of* CAUSES *and* EFFECTS.

FATALITY, neceſſity, and concatenation of cauſes and effects, is a three headed monſter like Cerberus, found in the dark and gloomy abode of the brains of the aforeſaid philoſophers; and ſprung, not like Minerva, as the fiction of the poets goes, out of the brains of Jupiter, to lead men to happineſs; but like the evils, out of Pandora's box, *for the deſtruction of mankind.*

What could be the intent of thoſe pretended philoſophers to inveigle us into the perſuaſion of our being neceſſary agents, but to teach us that there is no merit in the moſt virtuous action, nor any thing criminal, in the moſt horrid deed; that there is no difference between a Cartouche and a Saint; between a Phalaris, and a Piſiſtratus; or rather between a Nero and a Trajan, between a Richard the Third and a George the Third,

Third, our moſt gracious, humane and virtuous King; that both owe their actions, to an abſolute neceſſity, to the concurrence of cauſes and effects.

If, in the preſent age, men ſhould not be weaned out of the belief, that demons take ſometimes poſſeſſion of their bodies, we ſhould certainly think that they have choſen, now a-days, not the bodies of the enthuſiaſts, but thoſe of the aforeſaid philoſophers, for the temptation of men, for ſuch inſtruction could only come from *ſuch evil ſpirits*; nay, theſe philoſophers have outwitted them, for the firſt, we are told, tempt men to ſin, but the laſt try to perſuade us *there is no ſin at all*; but let us not miſpend time in declamation; our purpoſe here is not *to preach* but *to reaſon*.

What is *neceſſity*? The definition of neceſſity, which has puzzled philoſophers more than that of *liberty*, can be nothing elſe than *that which could not be otherwiſe than it is*; now there is nothing in this world that before it was, could not have been otherwiſe than

than it is; then it is evident that only neceſſity cannot exiſt in this world, I ſpeak of moral neceſſity.

This is the difference between the Creator and his creatures, that God, as the firſt cauſe, muſt exiſt, by neceſſity, and all the reſt by his will.

That a thing muſt by neceſſity be what it is after it was, no body will deny. A Potter having the clay in his hands, may form a pot or a diſh; if he makes a pot, only an idiot may deny, that it muſt be by neceſſity a pot, but he muſt be as great a fool who would perſuade us, that before it was formed into a pot, it could not have been a diſh.

All this bombaſtic expreſſion of *concatenation of cauſes and effects*, does not ſignify, but things which follow one another, which only after they have followed, muſt have followed by neceſſity; for a thing cannot have happened, and not have happened at the ſame time, as a thing cannot at the ſame time be and not be; if a man has murdered another, he muſt ſurely

have murdered him; but how does this prove that before he executed the murder, he was compelled by neceſſity to commit the crime?

If *fatality* is any thing, it can be no more than another phraſe for the immutable laws of nature, which we have proved, *(Section Eight)* to be nonſenſe, or the immutable laws of God; but as we have alſo ſhewn, *(Section Nine)* that there is no other immutable law of God in nature, but his free-will; he being the only cauſe, and all the reſt only effects, there can be no neceſſity in the effects, when there is no neceſſity of acting in the cauſe, and conſequently a man muſt only by neceſſity be a free agent.

Section XI.

Of the PRESCIENCE *of* GOD.

THE preſcience of God is the laſt *ſtrong hold* of the aforeſaid philoſophers, as a proof of the neceſſity of a man's conduct, which

which we ſhall now invade, and with it demoliſh all their fortifications.

If God, ſay they, has foreſeen every thing from all eternity, it muſt neceſſarily happen; for, if it does not, he has no foreſight.

This difficulty, though great to the believers, is very abſurd in the mouths of thoſe philoſophers; for as they deny the providence of God, and believe that he does not ſee our actions, nor liſten to our prayers, nor take any notice of this world, he might as well not foreſee; but as God muſt not only ſee, as we ſhall prove by and by, but alſo foreſee, their abſurdity lies in making a cauſe of what in its nature can produce no effect.

The knowledge of any event can never effect that event, neither can the fore-knowledge have that power. Does God by foreſeeing a thing take away his free-will? Is there any diviſion of time with God? Paſt, preſent, and future are all alike to him; his knowledge is not by ſucceſſion, but by intuition; at the ſame time he ſees and foreſees;

and what he ſees and foreſees, he performs by his free-will; how God does this is incomprehenſible to us; *we do not know*, ſays Newton, in anſwer to the ſame difficulty, *how God ſees, how then ſhall we pretend to know how he foreſees*? But the incomprehenſibility of a thing, cannot be a proof of its non-exiſtence, except to thoſe who will not believe but what they ſee and underſtand, who, as we have ſhewn, by the ſame principle, ought not to believe in God.

But let us judge as far as we can underſtand. I obſerve a madman running to the ſea; and foreſee he will drown himſelf: Does my foreſeeing compel or force him to the action? No. Where then is the neceſſity? Is it not even in my will, if I have power, to run after and ſave him from drowning? Surely it is; but then, you ſay, I have not foreſeen right, becauſe he was not drowned; but when I foreſaw he would drown himſelf, I foreſaw at the ſame time, as I had power, that if I ſhould run after him he would be ſaved, but though I was right in both things I foreſaw, this foreſight took not away my free-will

free-will to run, or not to run after him, and conſequently could never have produced a neceſſity of his being drowned or not; for while I was free I could bring about either of the two things I foreſaw; all the difference is, that in men theſe things follow one another by ſucceſſion, but in God his foreſight and free-will are at the ſame time, and by conſequence, where there is free-will there can be no neceſſity.

Section XII.

Of MATTER *and* NATURE.

THE aforeſaid philoſophers, who cannot believe but what they ſee and underſtand, not being able to ſee and to comprehend God, have choſen other deities, which they only worſhip, and call upon to ſolve all the phenomena of the univerſe, as if they could ſee and comprehend thoſe beings better than God, or as if they were even exiſting beings; theſe are *Matter* and *Nature*.

But

But matter and nature are ſo far from being God, that they do not exiſt as beings, but only in the imaginations of thoſe philoſophers.

Matter, if it means any thing, can only mean a collection of univerſal properties found in all bodies, without which no body can exiſt; as extenſion, figure, quantity, diviſibility of parts, its being liable to corruption or diſſolution, &c. and without doubt, a God with ſuch properties, would only deſerve the adoration of ſuch philoſophers.

Nature in the ſame manner, if it means any thing, for this word has ſo many ſignifications, that it has become of no ſignification at all, can only mean, as we have ſaid, *(Section Eight)* ſome particular properties, by which a body is eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from every other body; the nature or diſtinguiſhable property of a plant is to vegetate; what has no vegetation is no plant; the diſtinguiſhable properties of animals are ſenſation, thought, or inſtinct; and of men intellect or reaſon, each of theſe muſt be what our philoſophers call nature; and each of theſe

theſe would alſo make a very comprehenſible philoſophic God!

But if matter and nature are not beings, but only the properties of beings, how can they be God? If God is matter, that is, if God is a ſubſtance, (for without ſubſtance there can be no being,) with the properties of matter, he, being infinite, muſt not only have all the properties of matter, but all matter muſt be God; and why ſhould we wonder, that the Egyptians, worſhipped onions, when thoſe philoſophers, by their principles, ſhould worſhip ſtones.

Nature alſo, that is, each of the eſſential diſtinguiſhable properties of bodies, *can* be *neither matter nor God*, for thoſe properties by which bodies are eſſentially diſtinguiſhed can be no matter; matter being only thoſe univerſal properties, without which a body cannot exiſt; thus a man, an animal, a plant, and a ſtone, being bodies, muſt be matter, that is, they muſt have extenſion, figure, &c. but a ſtone may, and does really exiſt without vegetation, for that property does not

not belong to matter, and a body may exiſt without it; and likewiſe ſenſation, thought, intellect and reaſon, cannot be matter, nor the effect of matter, but ſomething elſe; arrange matter as you pleaſe, divide it, diſſolve it, you will never make it have underſtanding, nor even ſenſation.

But is it not poſſible for God, ſay theſe ſages, to give theſe properties to matter? That is to give to bodies, what the ſame philoſophers call the nature of bodies? Who can deny it? But then, it neceſſarily follows, that *God* who gave nature to matter, can be *neither matter nor nature*, becauſe in the fitneſs of things it is impoſſible, and by conſequence abſurd, that the giver be one and the ſame, as the thing given and the receiver; then God muſt be ſomething elſe, and above matter and nature, as the agent is above the paſſient, as the giver is above the receiver and the thing received, as the cauſe is above the effect, and as he that has exiſtence, power, and wiſdom, to what has no wiſdom nor power, nor can exiſt as a being without a ſubſtance.

Nature

Nature then, is a *gift of God*, which is in his power to give or not to give, for if it was not ſo, all matter, or all bodies, ſhould have, by neceſſity, the ſame nature, that is the ſame properties, which evidently proves not only that the eſſential diſtinguiſhable properties of bodies can neither be God, nor a conſequence or effect of matter, but ſomething elſe, given by the will of God and his power, and that is *what we call either nature, animation, ſoul, or mind*, according to its excellence; but what its ſubſtance is we cannot know, as we are ignorant of the firſt principles of every thing, and of all thoſe things, which not being perceived by our ſenſes, we can form no idea of; but though we cannot ſee them, nor underſtand them, we muſt believe their exiſtence.

Section XIII.

Of BODY *and* SOUL.

WE have ſhewn that matter and nature, in the ſenſe taken by the philoſophers, can be no beings, but one ſignifies

only a collection of eſſential properties, which a body cannot exiſt without, and the other an aggregation of eſſential properties, by which all kinds of bodies are diſtinguiſhed from one another.

But though the properties of matter by themſelves can be no beings, the union of them with their ſubſtances, conſtitutes a being which we call a body, without which no body can exiſt; and likewiſe the union of each eſſential diſtinguiſhable property, which we call *nature with its ſubſtance*, conſtitutes that being we call *ſoul*; and though a ſoul in man is a laughable thing among the unbelievers, becauſe they cannot ſee it, nor underſtand it, it muſt exiſt by their own confeſſion, not only in men but in all bodies.

All nature, ſay they, is animated, in which ſenſe they cannot take nature for God, but for the univerſe; but what is animation if it is not that which we call ſoul? If nature is animated, as they ſay, or if *nature is animation*, which I think would be a more proper expreſſion, it muſt be animated or inſpired by

by God; if God animated nature, he muſt have inſpired ſomething in nature to animate the ſame, and if nature is animation, nature muſt be that ſome thing inſpired; and one way or the other, is not this but a different expreſſion for what we call a *ſoul?* And conſequently there is not a body, which, beſides the properties of matter, has not ſome property which animates it, and this is its ſoul; therefore not only men, but brutes, plants, and even ſtones muſt have ſouls.

Let us illuſtrate this a little farther, let us examine what we find in all bodies; there is not a body we know but has all the properties we commonly claſs under the name of matter, which are all properties we ſee and underſtand, but bodies have two other properties, the cauſe of which we neither ſee nor underſtand, though they really exiſt, which are that cement which *coheres* the bodies and gives them extenſion, and that which makes them receive, retain and communicate the *motion* acquired by impulſe, be-

ſides the power of attraction and repulſion the great Newton diſcovered in all the ſyſtem of the univerſe.

Who is ſo wiſe, though they ſee the effect, as to ſee or underſtand the cauſe? If you aſk thoſe great men what or how it is, they do not know; but though they do not know nor underſtand, nor ſee the cauſe, it exiſts in all bodies; and what can it be but that which animates matter? And is not that which animates and puts the properties of matter together, and gives ſubſiſtence to a ſtone, by another name, the ſoul of a ſtone? as vegetation is the ſoul of a plant, ſenſation and thought of brutes, and reaſon of men.

SECTION XIV.

Of PAIN *and* PLEASURE.

BUT not inſiſting upon the ſoul of a ſtone, let us examine that of the brute.

Philoſophers are at variance on the thinking faculty of the brutes, ſome againſt what they ſee, becauſe they do not underſtand it, deny

deny their own eyes; and others, though they do not underſtand it, believe the brutes think becauſe they ſee it.

But though the brutes ſhould not think, as no body in his right ſenſes can deny, they have ſenſation and are ſuſceptible of pain and pleaſure; though there ſhould be a poſſibility to have ſenſation without thought, they muſt be animated and have a ſoul.

The pain and pleaſure of the ſoul is another laughable thing among thoſe gentlemen; but there is nothing more ridiculous than to believe the body ſuſceptible of pain or pleaſure. Arrange matter as you pleaſe, compound it, or diſcompound it as you will; diſſolve it by what menſtruum you think proper; analize it; ſublimate it; draw out its fixed air; its ſpirit, its æther or phlogiſton; torture it as you pleaſe, you can as little conceive it can ſuffer pain, or enjoy pleaſure, as to think or to reaſon.

If the fire burns my finger the pain is not in the fire, becauſe ſimple matter has no ſenſation; by the ſame reaſon it is not in the finger, becauſe if you ſhould burn the finger

of

of a dead man there would be no pain; the pain, ſay the philoſopher, reſides in the brain; but the brain is mere matter as well as the finger; then it muſt be *in ſomething lodged in the brain*, which can only be ſuſceptable of pain and pleaſure; but that ſomething which we can neither ſee nor underſtand, is *what we call the ſoul*.

A ſpider makes a web, and ſpins his lodging in the center; the leaſt fly which touches any thread of the web, moves his lodging and gives warning to the ſpider, which immediately ſallies forth to catch the fly, the feeling is not in the web, nor in the thread, nor in the lodging, it is in the animal within; ſo fire touches ſome of the nerves, which, through the whole body, are like the web of a ſpider; this communicates pain from the very thread that is touched, to their ſource, which is the brains, like the ſpider's neſt; but, in the ſame manner, if there was no ſpider, there would be no feeling, ſo if there was nothing that animated the brain there would be no pain;

pain; thus the pain is neither in the finger nor in the brain. but in the ſoul which animates it.

Conſequently it is ſo far from there not being pain or pleaſure in the ſoul, that *only the body cannot be liable to pain or pleaſure*, as we find it is in a dead body, from which it follows that even if animals ſhould not think, as they have ſenſation, ſelf motion, and feel pain and pleaſure, they muſt be animated and have a ſoul.

SECTION XV.

Of the SOULS *of* BRUTES *and* MEN.

BUT is there no difference between the ſouls of men and brutes? Yes; and a very ſpecial one: The ſoul of a brute is a ſubſtance that has ſenſation and thought, and that of man a ſubſtance that has not only ſenſation and thought but *reaſon*.

Brutes have only thought; by thought I mean the perception of ſenſible ideas, which are excited by their feelings or ſenſes, by which they only acquire the knowledge of preſent

preſent truths; but a man, by the power of reaſon, has the faculty of encreaſing his ideas by abſtraction, of compairing them in the abſence of their objects, and of finding unknown truths from thoſe which are known.

Brutes therefore have no invention, for *invention* is only the *effect of reaſon*; and it is by that power alone that algebraiſts and geometricians, proceeding from one equation, and from one theorem to the other, have diſcovered ſo many wonderful and unknown truths, which brutes whatever might be their abilities, whatever philoſophers may declaim of their capacity to learn by ſigns and cuſtom can never attain, nor arrive to the firſt ſelf-evident principles of truth; as that twice two is equal to four, or that they exiſt, and that there muſt be a cauſe endowed with power, wiſdom and goodneſs, which gave them exiſtence; the conviction of which truths is not the effect of ſimple thought, but of reaſon; and in this the ſouls of men are diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of brutes.

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The Rabbins are of opinion, that men have not only one, but four ſouls; the animating which conſtitutes all bodies; the vegetating which makes them grow, the ſenſible which makes them feel and perceive; and the rational which makes them reaſon; and that only the laſt is immortal.

However it be, the rational ſoul, which is that ſubſtance by God inſpired with reaſon, is the diſtinguiſhable property of men.

SECTION XVI.

Of The IMMORTALITY *of the* SOUL.

THE ſame philoſophers reflecting that, if brutes like men have ſouls, it muſt by neceſſity follow, that if the ſouls of men are immortal, thoſe of brutes muſt likewiſe be immortal; ſome, therefore, have made all brutes, automatons, or mere machines; and others have gone ſo far as to deny even a ſoul to men, making men likewiſe mere machines; and though they have never ſeen nor can underſtand, how a machine can have

ſelf-motion, ſenſation, pain, pleaſure, thought, reaſon, or will, they choſe rather to believe this abſurdity, than the exiſtence of a ſoul.

But if men, brutes, trees, or even ſtones are animated, that is, have ſouls, either all muſt be mortal or immortal; to which I anſwer, that what we ſee and what we know, and by conſequence can aſcertain by the rules of the aforeſaid philoſophers is, that as there are different ſorts of bodies there are *different kinds of animation*, and conſequently of ſouls, the animation which keeps the ſtone together, is not the ſame that vegetates in plants, and this is not the ſame which gives ſenſation to animals, or reaſon and free-will to men; we do not know what theſe animations are, for as we have no idea of the principles in nature, though we are convinced ſuch principles exiſt, our reaſon cannot form a juſt judgment of them.

If we can aſcertain any thing, it is by analogy; but this is in favour of the immortality of the ſoul, for we never ſee that matter is extinguiſhed; and why ſhould we ſuppoſe

poſe that what animates matter will periſh; we find when a man is dead he has the ſame material parts, which he had when living; an animal the ſame; notwithſtanding the principal thing is wanting, which gave him life, ſenſation, ſelf-motion, pain, pleaſure, thought, reaſon, and will; that being in one word, the ſoul which animated him; and if we do not ſee the leaſt eſſential periſh, which is the matter, why ſhould we think that the more eſſential, which is that which animated him will be deſtroyed.

Nothing exiſts but by the will of God, and *every thing might be mortal or immortal, according to his pleaſure*; he might make only immortal the ſouls of men, or make even immortal the ſoul of brutes; for we have ſhown *there is no other nature in things but his will.*

SECTION XVII.

Of MATTER, SPIRIT *and* SUBSTANCE.

WHETHER the ſoul is matter or ſpirit, is a great queſtion among philo-

ſophers, in the ſolution of which, there has been more paper and ink waſted than would load a cart; and if we aſk the ſame philoſophers what is ſpirit and matter, they all agree it is above their comprehenſion.

Now I aſk, how is it poſſible to judge whether the *ſoul* is *matter* or *ſpirit*, when we are equally ignorant of the nature of all three? I muſt leave this explanation to thoſe philoſophers who preſume to know every thing, and who after inventing names without aſcertaining their meaning, will rather aſſert a parcel of abſurdities, than acknowledge their ignorance.

All what we know or can know, is, that a body is a ſubſtance that is extended, has figure, parts, quantity, &c. and a ſoul is a ſubſtance that has properties to animate that body; but what theſe ſubſtances are, we know as little of one as the other.

The ſubſtance of water is water; of ſalt is ſalt, of gold is gold, and ſo the ſubſtance of a ſoul, is ſoul, and of God is God; we only know ſome of their properties, but of their

their *ſubſtance we know nothing but the name*, and he who pretends to know any more, is not a philoſopher but a fool.

Things which are above the human comprehenſion, we cannot find by mere natural reaſon; if we know any thing about it, it muſt be by a ſtronger inſpiration of the ſoul, that is by revelation.

SECTION XVIII.

Of REASON.

REASON, as we have ſhown, *(Section Fifteen)* is that power inſpired by God in the ſoul of men, to acquire unknown and abſent truths, from thoſe that are ſenſible and preſent; the ſtrength of which differs as much in different men, as the ſtrength or ſolidities of bodies differ from one another; for as bodies animated only by the power of coheſion, are ſtronger or have more ſolidity, according as that power is greater to cohere their parts cloſer, ſo the reaſon of men, is ſtronger, and more powerful, accord-

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ing as that power is more or leſs inſpired in the ſoul; and the greater this inſpiration is, the greater *ſolidity* is in a man's reaſon.

The reaſon of a clown is far below that of a Newton, or a Locke, though the ſtrength of his body may be greater; for I believe thoſe learned philoſophers would make but poor huſbandmen, and pitiful ſoldiers, tho' they excelled in reaſon almoſt every man; for the ſtrength of reaſon is not in proportion to that of the body, but of its proper force which can only be acquired by a ſtronger inſpiration.

SECTION XIX.

Of REVELATION *and its* POSSIBILITY

THERE is nothing where the atheiſts deiſts, free-thinkers, or let it be modern philoſophers which is the honourable appellation they take, to the diſhonour of philoſophy, there is nothing, I ſay, againſt which they have exerted more force, and combated with more ſtrength, than againſt revelation

revelation; this has become among them the object of the utmoſt ridicule, without having attempted once, a proper definition of that term.

Now revelation is the conviction of a truth, which cannot be attained by common reaſon, but only by a ſtronger inſpiration of the ſoul, and by which the ſoul is convinced, that the knowledge of it, comes from God who cannot err; for there is no man who believes that God has mouth, or the organs of ſpeech, or hands or feet, though the ſcripture tells us, that God ſtretched his hands, that he walked and ſpoke; every ſenſible man knows that theſe are figurative expreſſions of his power and his will.

Now as revelation is only a *ſtronger inſpiration of the mind than common reaſon*, where is the impoſſibility that God, who inſpired a Newton with reaſon, to acquire truths ſo far above the comprehenſion of a clown, could, or would not, inſpire ſome men with reaſon to acquire truths far above the wiſdom of a Newton, which is that of prophecy; not for

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the acquiſition of phyſical truths, but of thoſe that will lead a man to everlaſting happineſs.

Revelation then differs only from reaſon, not in eſſence, but in the proportion of more or leſs; both being equally the gift of God, and acquired by his inſpiration.

Section XX.

Of PROPHECY.

PROPHECY is nothing but the interpretation of the mind of God, of ſome truth he has pleaſed to reveal to the prophet, for the happineſs and ſalvation of men, to inſtruct them in their duty, or correct them for their ſins.

But here our philoſophers object, that though a prophet ſhould be convinced by inſpiration that his truth comes from God, how is it poſſible to carry that conviction to men who have not the ſame inſpiration? Cannot every man pretend he is inſpired? Were there no falſe prophets? Is there any proper

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or undoubted proof of their being true? Falſe prophets, they ſay, have performed as many wonders as the true ones; the magicians of Pharaoh have executed almoſt the ſame wonders as Moſes: then what will convince us of the conviction or prophecy of another man? Nothing elſe but the truth and right of what he ſays.

But how ſhall we know that it is true and right? God has given us a *ſtandard*, he *has declared his will*, and every thing which is agreeable to his will muſt be right and true, and conſequently muſt come from him; and even if the prophet ſhould not have been inſpired by God, if he keeps to his character, that is, as we have ſaid, only to promote the happineſs and ſalvation of men, to inſtruct them in their duty, or correct them for their ſins, he is a true interpreter of the mind of God, and conſequently a prophet; and what is contrary to the aforeſaid ends, even if it could poſſibly come from a prophet muſt be falſe, and ought to be rejected, or explained agreeable to the will of God.

The *will of God* is the *touch-ſtone* of prophecies, for what is not agreeable to his will cannot come from him by inſpiration; this is expreſſed plainly in the ſacred writings, "If "there ariſe among you a prophet or dreamer "of dreams, and giveth thee a ſign or a wonder, and the ſign or wonder come to paſs "whereof he had ſpoken to thee, ſaying let "us go after other Gods which thou had "not known, and let us ſerve them, thou "ſhall not hearken to the words of that "prophet, &c." *Deuter.* 13.

Thus, it is neither ſigns nor wonders which confirm a prophecy; it is not that the prediction comes or does not come to paſs, but that what the prophet ſays be agreeable to the will of God; and as God has given us a ſtandard of his will, and as every man is inſpired with reaſon ſtrong enough to be certain, as we have ſhown, of the exiſtence, wiſdom, power and goodneſs of God, all laws which are agreeable to thoſe attributes, are certainly directed by the will of God, and revealed by him; and conſequently all thoſe

which

have no other end than to lead us to which true happineſs, to direct us in our duty, and to correct us for our ſins.

But let revelation be only a ſtronger inſpiration of the ſoul, or that God, by forming a voice in the air, declared his will, or in a *more lively manner* as the prophecy of Moſes was; we ſhall prove revelation not only by its poſſibility but by its *neceſſity*.

SECTION XXI.

The NECESSITY *of* REVELATION.

THE neceſſity of revelation is an infallible conſequence of the *creation*; if there muſt have been a firſt man, or firſt men, as thoſe who deny revelation pretend, theſe were created either in the ſtate of infancy, or in the ſtate of manhood; if in the ſtate of infancy, they could not live, for they were not able to provide for themſelves; if in the ſtate of manhood, where have they acquired experience and ideas? If we muſt learn to ſee how they have learned to preſerve themſelves,

then, even born in the ſtate of manhood, they could have had no more knowledge than infants juſt born.

Now I would aſk thoſe wiſe men who deny revelation how thoſe *infant men* could live and preſerve themſelves, without knowledge and inſpiration communicated immediately by God, and not acquired by time and experience? And what elſe is revelation? Therefore revelation was of abſolute neceſſity in the world; for the firſt man could not have lived, neither could he or his offspring have been preſerved without it.

But yet they will argue that though they ſhould be obliged to admit revelation in the firſt man, there was no neceſſity for any revelation in the following generations; *natural laws* were ſufficient to teach men, not only their *preſervation*, but even all their moral duties; but the abſurdity of this opinion we ſhall ſhow in the next.

SECTION XXII.

NATURAL LAWS *and* SUICIDE.

WE have ſhewn *(Section Eight)* that laws of nature are words inconſiſtent and of no meaning, and ſo likewiſe muſt be that of natural laws; but not to inſiſt upon words, we ſhall here ſuppoſe the meaning of thoſe philoſophers by that expreſſion; and if it can mean any rational and conſiſtent thing, it is, *that a man by his own reaſon and experience might acquire the knowledge of his preſervation*, that is, of the duties owing to himſelf to exiſt as a ſolitary man; and of all moral duties, which, as a ſocial man, he owes to his neighbours, that he may preſerve himſelf in ſociety.

Self love is and muſt be the only foundation of all natural laws; this makes even a chick, when it is able, break its encloſure, to come out of the egg, where he finds himſelf confined; and this makes a child ſtruggle to come out of his mother's womb; if a man

man was not a ſociable being, there would not be occaſion for any other law; for neither juſtice nor injuſtice would exiſt in the world; and even after men entered into ſociety, ſelf preſervation alone was ſufficient to diſtinguiſh property and to eſtabliſh laws to ſecure it.

But to ſhow the weakneſs and futility of thoſe mighty reaſons, we have no more than to conſider that men who are accounted great men among the unbelievers, have pleaded for *ſuicide*. I believe no one will, after this, aſſert that the laws of nature are ſufficient for the preſervation of men, when even the reaſon of ſome philoſophers is ſo perverted, as to be advocates for ſelf-deſtruction.

Beſides, we find that even in ſpite of revelation, ſome men, (who are like wild horſes which cannot be tamed by any curb) will deſtroy themſelves, by intemperance, lewdneſs, and the ſatisfaction of their irregular and immoderate deſires; how can we believe then, that the laws of nature alone would be ſufficient to the preſervation of men?

A bad education, bad company, deteſtable books, and immoderate deſires, will, we find, pervert ſo much the reaſon even of great men, and of uncommon abilities, that even for a man's own preſervation, he muſt be brought to, by other ſtronger incentives than mere plain reaſon.

A man ought to preſerve his life not only by the dictates of ſelf-love, but for the duty he owes to God. "A man ought not," ſays Pythagoras, "to quit his poſt without the "command of his general, nor to eſcape out "of his priſon, without order of his ma-"giſtrate."

Now, it is God who has given us this life, and who is the only maſter of it, to take it away when he pleaſes; it is he who has commanded us *to take great care of our lives*; who has put before us *life and death*, and ordered us *to chuſe in life*; who commands us abſolutely *not to commit murder*, without diſtinction of Perſons; and *to confide in him*, and reſign ourſelves to his will in all our troubles; who muſt certainly be greatly offended, and hardly

hardly will forgive, to ſee us throw in his face, or ſhew contempt of a life which he has given us, as the greateſt preſent; and who having, as we have ſhewn *(Section Fourteen)* laid pain and pleaſure not in the body but in the ſoul, the taking away our life might be ſo far to deliver us from pain, by ſeparating their union, that the ſoul, on the contrary, may remain eternally with the pain of the aforeſaid reflection, which being in its ſeparation more fully known, will certainly encreaſe greatly his pain and ſorrow; and if a man ſhould not believe any other *hell*, or future puniſhment than this, *for there is no man that could prove yet the impoſſibility of man having a ſoul which might exiſt after the diſſolution of his body*, is not the eternal remorſe that a ſoul muſt have by the eternal conſciouſneſs of his actions, puniſhment enough? And if even this was uncertain, would any man exchange a momentary pain which is neither certain it will laſt his whole life, (for we have ſeen many brought to the loweſt ebb, riſe again, when they leaſt

leaſt expected it, to the higheſt ſtate of happineſs; would he exchange this, even for an uncertain pain that might prey upon him to all eternity?

This and much more that I could ſay, I am ſure would not be ſufficient to convince a Hume; and how can natural reaſon alone be ſufficient without revelation, to conduce a man to his own preſervation?

Let us now ſee if the ſame natural law conduce men to all moral duties.

SECTION XXIII.

NATURAL LAWS *not ſufficient to promote* MORAL DUTIES.

MORAL laws were neceſſary to unite men in ſociety, where the object is not the preſervation of one individual only, but that of the whole community; and *ſelf-love*, the only natural law, which makes us look for our own preſervation, muſt alſo be the only law which makes us provide for the preſervation of the whole; for we find that by our union we become ſtron-

ger, and by being of uſe to the whole, the whole muſt be uſeful to us.

Thus, the ſame principle which excites us to preſerve ourſelves, is the only fundamental or natural law, which induces us to the preſervation of our neighbours; and that great law, not to do to others what we ſhould not like to be done to us, *quod tibi non vis alteri ne facias*, which is the ſource of all moral duties, is only the conſequence of our ſelf-preſervation; for if we are permitted to hurt another, another will likewiſe be permitted to hurt us; and if I can take another man's property, another will alſo take mine; and to conſerve my own, I ought not to deprive any one of his; and from this principle alone, ſprung *government*, *juſtice*, and all laws of *equity*.

But we have ſhewn that the inducement of ſelf-preſervation, is ſo far from having force to preſerve ourſelves, ſo far from being a natural law, that even men who call themſelves philoſophers, are advocates for ſelf-deſtruction; and if the laws of nature are ſo weak, that

that they cannot preſerve the man himſelf, how ſhall they be of force to preſerve any other? Does not experience convince us that there are but *few men, who are not partial to themſelves*; and many who deſire from others, what they never would deſire to do themſelves? Let men alone to nature, let there be no laws to ſubject them, and the ſtrongeſt will ſacrifice the weakeſt to his own pleaſure, ſelf-love, and ſatisfaction.

Let us only conſider the cruelties, violences, and barbarities uſed by men in time of war, by men who have no animoſity or ill-will againſt one another, by men who might even have been friends, if war had not been proclaimed, and we ſhall be ſoon convinced how little force theſe pretended laws of nature have over us.

A permiſſion given only by a King, who has or has no reaſon to quarrel with another, is ſufficient for a man (though he knows nothing about the matter, nor even cares any thing about it) to *rob* the property of another man, to ſet it *on fire*, to *murder* him, to

violate his *wife* and *daughter*, and to commit with impunity the moſt horrid *crimes*; and what moral laws can thoſe nations have, who *hire*, as Voltaire ſays "their ſubjects for "war to another power, and ſometimes to "both parties, to kill and deſtroy one ano-"ther?" No other laws than intereſt, which is enough to change men into fierce beaſts; and is the only law which men naturally obey; to curb which, as natural laws are not ſufficient, there is a neceſſity for revelation.

SECTION XXIV.

That REVELATION *was not* PARTIAL *but* UNIVERSAL,

WE have ſhewn *(Section Twenty-one)* that revelation is an infallible conſequence of the creation of men; that men could not have ſubſiſted, if God, when he made the firſt man, had not inſpired into him proper knowledge for his preſervation, and with it the moral laws for the preſervation of

of the following generations; which could not be done without inſpiring into him the knowledge of his exiſtence, his wiſdom, and goodneſs, and this revelation was tranſmitted from Adam to Noah, and from Noah to the whole world, and which is only ſufficient to ſave the whole world; *for no nation except the Jews, is obliged to obſerve the Jewiſh laws.*

For that reaſon, the apoſtles in their firſt ſolemn *conſilium*, agreeing with our Rabbins, never impoſed upon the Gentiles, beſides the belief of God and moral laws, of all the Jewiſh ceremonial ordinances, but only the *Noabchid laws*, which were the firſt revealed laws; as we find in the 15th chapter of the Acts of the Apoſtles; and which were *the primitive chriſtian laws.*

But as we have ſhewn *(Section Four)* that men in ſucceſſion of time, after the flood, began to put viſible images to repreſent the true Gods, and *ſome* after, to believe them as Gods; and as *all* might, in time, become ſo barbarous as to forget the creation of the world, and deny even the exiſtence and

power

power of God, he choſe one people whom he bound with ſuch commandments as to be *an everlaſting monument*, in ſpite of the natural revolutions, all nations are liable to in this world, *of his power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, and to confirm the creation of the world*: Thoſe laws were only given to this people, not becauſe God wanted to ſave them only from all the nations, but becauſe their *exiſtence*, their *commandments*, their *ceremonies*, and even their *diſperſion* ſhould be a living monument and everlaſting teſtimony *to ſave them all.*

Thus it was ſo far from God being partial to the Jews, or of making an *arbitrary choice of one people*, as D. H. pleaſes to ſay, *as the only favourite of heaven*, that he only incumbered them with ſo many laws, and charged them with all thoſe laws that were neceſſary to preſerve them, to keep them ſeparate, and not to be confounded among the reſt; and even to diſperſe them among all nations, to be to all an everlaſting teſtimony of the creation of the world, of the exiſtence of God, and his power to command nature according

cording to his pleaſure; and to *ſave all nations*, by bringing them back to the *primitive revelation*, which was *the Noachid laws, which only all nations ought to obſerve.*

That this was the ſpirit of the Jewiſh laws, that they effected it in part, and will farther effect the purpoſe for which they were inſtituted, we will prove in the next, where we will ſhew.

SECTION XXV.

That the JEWISH LAWS *were the only* LAWS *which preſerved the* NATION *and* THEMSELVES.

LET us aſk the philoſophers, if they can tell, where the great conquerors of the world are at preſent! which are the Aſſyrians, the Babylonians, the Perſians, the Grecians, and the Romans, and where are their laws? They are all extinguiſhed or confounded, only the Jews; that people ſo many times *conquered*, ſo often *perſecuted*, and at laſt *diſperſed* through the whole world, have alone been

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able to preſerve themſelves and their laws; this miracle, not to be accounted for, by the laws of nature, was only the reſult of the divine law; which could only foreſee and provide for the continuation of ſuch a wonder.

The quantity of our ceremonial commandments, *was a neceſſary yoke* and even *the curb added by our Rabbins*, was of abſolute neceſſity to preſerve us; the moſt trifling circumſtances, and even thoſe which in the eyes of men appear ridiculous, and not worthy of God; were in the eyes of that only wiſe being, very neceſſary for the end of preventing the confuſion and annihilation of a people, whom he propoſed to be witneſſes of his exiſtence, his goodneſs, and his power.

Their eating, their drinking, their dreſſing and their manner of living, was different from all nations; and was only the cauſe of not being confounded with them, and an effectual cauſe; their ſabbaths, and holydays, were only living monuments of the creation of the world; and a teſtimony of all the wonders the Almighty worked with them; how it

was poſſible to make three millions of people, or above ſix millions, as the Jews were in the time of David, obſerve the paſſover in memory of their coming out of Egypt; the tabernacles, in remembrance of their having lived in the wilderneſs forty years in tents; the feaſt of weeks, as they believe, in memory of having received the law, &c. &c. if they had not known the truth of all theſe tranſactions, in memory of which all thoſe laws were ordained.

But thoſe laws tended not only to preſerve the Jews, and make them remember the wonders of God; but their laws were a conſtant witneſs to all the nations, to convince them of the exiſtence of God, and his power in their miraculous preſervation, as it is foretold by the ſame law, " *and yet for all that,* " *when they be in the land of their enemies, I will* " *not caſt them away, neither will I abhor them,* " *to deſtroy them utterly, and to break my co-* " *venant with them,*" LEVIT. *chap* 26, and thus the preſervation of the Jews was neceſ-

ſary to the ſalvation of the whole world; by confounding the atheiſts and unbelievers with a multitude of *ever living witneſſes, and everlaſting monuments.*

But, as this is not the only character of the divinity of this law, let us compare the Jewiſh law, with the laws and cuſtoms of the former nations.

SECTION XXVI.

COMPARISON *of the* CUSTOMS *and* LAWS *of different* NATIONS, *with thoſe of the* JEWS.

THE antient Germans and the Lacedemonians permitted *robbery* and rewarded it; all the Grecians, *the wiſe and learned Grecians, expoſed their children to* be devoured by wild beaſts; the fathers among the Romans, were permitted *to murder their children*; and theſe nations ſo much admired, worſhipped not only *images*, but images of Gods, *and had all the vices of their Gods*, to which they *offered human ſacrifices.*

ſacrifices. Themiſtocles that great and admired Admiral, offered three children to *Bacchus* the devourer, before the battle with Xerxes. *Adultery*, *ſodomy*, and *beaſtiality*, were the vices of their divinities, and their own vices; the greateſt men amongſt the Romans, even Cicero and Cæſar were guilty of the execrable unnatural crime, and theſe Romans, *theſe wiſe and great Romans*, determined the moſt mighty tranſactions by the colour of the entrails of a beaſt, the picking of a cock, or the flying of a bird, and other *auguries and auſpices*; which are deteſted with ſo much reaſon by the laws of Moſes.

The ſatyrs, thoſe monſters who, by the account of their own hiſtorians, were ſo abundant in theſe times, were only the generation of beaſtiality, which Monſieur De Voltaire could not find, but among the Jews, a nation which was only free of thoſe abominations, and which by the commandment of God devoted to deſtruction thoſe who were guilty of them.

But let us paſs to other nations; the Herulians uſed to *kill the ſick and old*, and did not permit the wives to ſurvive their huſbands: The Caſpians uſed to *ſtarve* to death, in a jail *their old fathers*; Thomas Cornely affirms that even at preſent, two hundred perſons are *murdered* every day for the table of the king of Mococco, near Congo, maſter of the greateſt part of Africa; and it is a conſtant cuſtom, even to this day, when the chief of the Coromantees dies, to cut off the *heads* of all his ſervants and to fix them round *his grave*. The Indians wives, are held in the greateſt contempt, if they do not *burn* themſelves at the death of their huſbands. The Perſians permitted all kind of *inceſt*, and held the iſſue of the *ſon* with the *mother* ſo ſacred, that they were made prieſts. *

Now, if the Jews had ſuch laws, Voltaire and his followers had ſufficient right to call them barbarous, and to believe the impoſſibility of ſuch laws being inſpired by God; but when we find at a time, when the

* See Puffendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, Book 2, Chap 3, No. 8, where the reader will find a great number of ſimiliar barbarous cuſtoms.

whole

whole world practiſed ſuch abominations, and were ſo barbarous, a nation who had only laws which forbad them to follow thoſe barbarous cuſtoms, and which endeavoured to bring them to the worſhip of the true God, we muſt believe that ſuch laws could only be inſpired by him.

But let us examine the ancient laws moſt celebrated by modern philoſophers; and omitting Draco's *bloody laws*, which Ariſtotle ſays, were more fitted for a *dragon* than for a man; let us compare the laws of Solon and Lycurgus, which were the moſt famous, with the Jewiſh laws: And firſt,

Section XXVII.

Of SOLON'S LAWS *compared with the* JEWISH LAWS.

IF we ſhould only conſider that the laws of Solon and Lycurgus eſtabliſhed *idolatry*, that Solon himſelf offered an ox to *Apollo*, and that Lycurgus conſulted the *oracle at Delphos*, and knew how to bribe the propheteſs to tell him, "wel-

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" come beloved of God, and rather God than man," and that Moſes only recommends the worſhip of the true inviſible God, creator of heaven and earth; *a God who has no ſimilitude to any thing, either in the earth below, or in the heavens above* (a more intelligible definition, than all which the philoſophers have ſaid of God) and that he deteſts the worſhip of any other deity, this alone is ſufficient to ſhew *the ſuperiority* of the law of Moſes.

But let us examine Solon's laws and his inſtitutions in particular.

The poor were indebted to the rich, and Solon could find no other expedient, than to cancel all the debts; but as he did not touch the lands, the effect of this proceeding was, that his friends to whom he communicated his deſign, borrowed a great deal of money, with which they purchaſed many lands, and retained them without being obliged to pay the money; and as this was the proceeding of Solon's friends, Solon himſelf was ſuſpected to have had an hand

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in it; how be it, he never provided for thoſe that had been ſo much impoſed upon, nor made any law to prevent the ſame in future: But by the laws of Moſes, ſuch a caſe could never happen; every man knew that all debts were of themſelves canceled at the ſeventh year; and every man governed himſelf accordingly; the lands were never ſold, but only leaſed for a certain time, according to the years wanting for the jubilee; after which they returned to their owners.

By theſe juſt laws, the poor could never be too much indebted; and their lands and houſes were ſure to return back to them and their children; beſides, by providing that no man could take of another the leaſt intereſt, the debt could never encreaſe, and the rich would not be willing to lend without profit; and by making ſo many charitable laws for the ſubſiſtence of the poor, by not permitting the rich to take in pawn their tools, the poor could always work, ſubſiſt, and pay their ſmall debts; this was cutting up diſſention

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by the root, and ſerving the poor without hurting the rich; but Solon's firſt law was unjuſt and againſt equity, by taking away the property of one man to give it to another, and if he had any hand with his friends, it was *a plain robbery*.

The law of obliging a man when the country is divided into two parties, to ſide with one or the other, even if he ſhould think both in the wrong, under penalty of loſing his eſtate and ſuffering baniſhment, was a barbarous law; and though Plutarch tells us that it was calculated for the public good, "for the wiſe and juſt, being obliged, as well "as the envious and wicked, to chuſe ſome "ſide, matters were eaſily accommodated," it is certain that if thoſe juſt and wiſe men had remained neuter and partial to no ſide, they would ſooner be heard from both parties; beſides, no man ſhould be obliged to do wrong, and therefore the laws of Moſes which forbid *to ſide even with the multitude in the wrong*, muſt, by conſequence, be ſuperior to Solon's laws.

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By the laws of Solon, the next of kin to an heireſs, might oblige her to marry him, ſhe alſo might require him, and if he refuſed, he was obliged to pay five hundred drachmas for her dower, but after marriage if the huſband was impotent, ſhe might have had recourſe to her huſband's neareſt relation, but her huſband was obliged to viſit her at leaſt thrice every month; the intent of this law was, that a rich heireſs might not carry her eſtate out of the family; therefore if her neareſt of kin happened to be a dwarf, a hump-back, or however deformed; or what was worſe, if he happened to be a libertine, a diſſolute and worthleſs fellow, ſhe was obliged to take him; and if ſhe happened likewiſe to be a proſtitute, he was alſo obliged to marry her, if he had not five hundred drachmas to pay for her dower; and what crowned all, in caſe the huſband could not ſatisfy her deſires, ſhe might apply to the neareſt relation of her huſband, to provide her with children.

Now, let us ſee in what manner Moſes handled this law, let the heireſs (ſays the law) *marry to whom ſhe likes beſt, only to the families of the tribe of her father ſhe ſhall marry, that the inheritance of the children of Iſrael may not remove from tribe to tribe.* Deuteronomy, 36 chap. 6 verſe.

By this excellent law the patrimony was kept in her tribe; neither ſhe nor he were obliged to marry but to thoſe they liked beſt, and adultery was not permitted; though, in caſe of diſlike, there was a facility of divorce, or the huſband might take another wife. Whatever Free-thinkers may believe of theſe two laws, that of Moſes was evidently the beſt.

The law of marriage, where Solon orders that the bride ſhall bring no more with her than three gowns, and ſome houſhold goods, though much celebrated, was not ſo good as the law of Moſes, by which a woman was not obliged to bring any thing, but a man was obliged to *purchaſe his wife*; for a wife ought to be (to prevent confuſion in the

the generation) the man's property, not the man the property of his wife; and from this principle Polygamy was permitted, and it was not accounted adultery for a married man to take another wife, but only for a married woman to take another huſband.

If Solon decreed that no man ſhould reviſe another at ſacred ſolemnities, in the courts of juſtice, or in public ſpectacles; Moſes forbad ſuch behaviour any where, *and even to a deaf man who cannot hear*,

If Solon permitted thoſe who were childleſs to leave their eſtates to whom they pleaſed, and Moſes decreed that the *neareſt of kin ſhould inherit the lands*, Moſes was conſiſtent in his plan of not leaving the patrimony to go out of the family, and Solon inconſiſtent, in obliging an heireſs to marry the neareſt of kin, and, at the ſame time, permitting a man to leave his eſtate to whom he pleaſed.

If Solon forbad a man to put his daughter, or his ſiſter, to the ſcandalous trade of proſti-

tution, unleſs he firſt ſurpriſed her with a man, Moſes more wiſely *ordered that no proſtitute ſhould be in Iſrael.* By Solon's laws parents were impowered to *ſacrifice* their children; but the laws of Moſes puniſhed ſuch unnatural crimes with death.

Solon's laws againſt *theft* were almoſt the ſame, viz; to make two-fold reſtitution, as thoſe of Moſes, except the thief was found in the night breaking into his neighbour's premiſes, then it was lawful for any man to kill him in his own defence.

I believe what has been ſaid, is ſufficient to convince the reader that the laws of Moſes are more rational than thoſe of Solon; without being under the neceſſity of quoting all thoſe excellent moral laws we find in the chapters 21, 22, 23, of Exodus, in the 17, 18 and 19 of Leviticus, and in other places of holy writ.

The ſuperiority of Moſes as a law-giver, will appear conſpicuous when compared with Solon, eſpecially in reſpect to the latter mak-

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ing honourable the commiſſion of a moſt unnatural crime, of which he himſelf ſet the example. On the contrary Moſes decreed that perſons convicted of ſuch a horrible offence ſhould ſuffer death.

Section XXVIII.

Of the LAWS *of* LYCURGUS.

BUT it was not Solon's laws which were the moſt grateful to the palates of modern philoſophers, the laws which more enchanted them, were thoſe of Lycurgus; but let us examine the laws of the latter, ſo much celebrated by Plutarch among the antients, and Voltaire and his followers among the moderns.

The laws of Lycurgus were certainly proper to accuſtom men, and even women, to ſuffer want, and fatigue, and to fit them for *war*; the laws of Moſes, on the contrary, were only intended to promote *peace*.

The lewdneſs permitted and encouraged among the Lacedemonians, removed from

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them, the tenderneſs and affection of parents, and even the mothers were remarkably deficient to their offspring; for proſtitutes never have that love and tenderneſs for their children, ſo conſpicuous in honeſt women; becauſe, having no fathers to help them to bring the infants up, the load becomes too great for them to bear, and diminiſhes their affection.

"The long and helpleſs infancy of men "(ſays one of thoſe philoſophers) requires "the combination of parents, for the ſub-"ſiſtance of their young; and that combina-"tion requires the virtue of chaſtity, and "fidelity in the marriage bed;" but as this was only required in the laws of Moſes, and not in thoſe of Lycurgus, the latter deſerve to be called barbarous laws.

The heroiſm of the Lacedemonian matrons, who were little or not at all affected by the death of their children in war ſo they heard of the victory, proceeded from the ſame principle; becauſe their own ſafety was dearer

dearer to them than the lives of their children, and that ſacrifice, of their offspring to their ſelf-love, could certainly not be found in the laws of Moſes, whoſe ſpirit was peace, humanity, love, and tenderneſs to their offspring.

To eat only *black broth*, where the chief ingredient was *blood*, made palatable with a little ſalt and vinegar; to ſleep upon reeds; to receive now and then a ſevere *flagellation*; would certainly harden their bodies, give them *fierceneſs*, and make them endure the calamities of *war*; but the laws of Moſes, which were directed to a far better end, which was peace, could not order but the contrary; and would not permit the Jews *to tear their bodies*, even for the dead, nor to eat blood at all; for Moſes wanted to create a people of *men*, and not of wild and fierce *beaſts*.

All the laws of Lycurgus certainly aimed at one object only, *war*; but, is war the only end of the creation of men? What is war? The moſt horrid, the moſt cruel evil in the world, ſays the ſame Voltaire. And is not

not that a plain confeſſion that the laws of Lycurgus were only fitted to promote the greateſt evils?

The Lacedemonians, it is true, were fitted for war, but what was the conſequence of that fitneſs? That, right or wrong, they made war, without looking but for the benefit of victory; that even they declared war againſt the unarmed and innocent Elotes their ſervants; that at laſt the ſame victories brought gold and ſilver amongſt them; and by conſequence luxury, deſtroying firſt their laws, and after, by teaching war to their enemies, they promoted their own deſtruction.

Where can be the excellence of a country, by whoſe laws *commerce and trade* is forbidden, *navigation* not permitted, and *arts and ſciences* deſpiſed? Where even a piece of rye bread would be a luxury; where *robbery* was rewarded, and the greateſt cheat went unpuniſhed.

The hiſtory of Euphones, ſoon after the laws of Lycurgus were eſtabliſhed, will ſhew

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us the great *honeſty* of the Lacedemonians. A Meſſenian truſted a Lacedemonian with ſome cows, on condition they ſhould divide the profit ariſing from the milk; the cunning Spartan ſold the cows with the herdſmen, and went to the Meſſenian informing him that a ſad accident happened to him, of ſome robbers who had ſtolen the cows, but as ſome of the herdſmen, who eſcaped from their new maſter, arrived at the ſame time, they falſified all that he ſaid, and he was obliged to confeſs the truth, and told the Meſſenian, that if he would ſend his ſon with him to Sparta, he would give him half of the purchaſe money, which offer the other eagerly embraced; but when the Meſſenian's ſon arrived with the Lacedemonian at Sparta, the Lacedemonian moſt perfidiouſly murdered the young man.

Thus far the laws of Lycurgus promoted *honeſty* amongſt individuals; but at leaſt we ſhould expect the laws would puniſh with the greateſt ſeverity ſuch perfidy; but the caſe

was otherwiſe, Polichrates the father of the deceaſed Meſſenian demanded juſtice, but the Lacedemonians took no notice of him, which was the cauſe of the firſt Meſſenian war; and why did they not take notice of ſuch horrid deeds? Becauſe the end of the laws of Lycurgus was not humanity, nor juſtice, but war; and *ſuch laws* are only fit to be revered by *ſuch philoſophers*.

We have ſeen how much Voltaire liked theſe laws; but let us ſuppoſe, for a moment, that the Helvetians (who alſo bring up their young men to war) had taken it into their heads to have eſtabliſhed the laws of Lycurgus, during Voltaire's reſidence among them, how would that philoſopher have reliſhed ſuch a ſyſtem of legiſlation? He would certainly have admired the pretty girls with jerkings that reached to their knees, and open at both ſides; he would poſſibly like the ſtruggle of naked boys and girls in the public places, and all other liberties taken among them, (not fit to be mentioned) rather than

than to ſee thoſe Jeweſſes, who, by the laws of Moſes, *could not diſcover their nakedneſs*, and even were forbidden to dreſs in mens clothes for the ſake of decency; and if I was diſpoſed to be a little hard upon him, (though not ſo hard as he was upon the poor Jews) I could ſay, that, if the Dutch printers were in the right, he would have been better pleaſed with the *ſtratagems* of the Helvetians, metamorphoſed into Lacedemonians, their *ſimulation* and *infidelity*, than with that ſtale commandment of Moſes *not to deceive one another*.

But how would he like that they ſhould take away his property to divide it among thoſe, that had neither houſe nor home, to be obliged to lie upon reeds, and to live upon black broth? Certainly he would prefer a law where, even if he was, through neceſſity, obliged to ſell his eſtate, it would return to him in the jubilee; and by which, except with reſpect to unwholeſome things, he might eat what he pleaſed.

How would he like, if being a bachelor, to be obliged to walk naked in the public market, to ſing his worthleſneſs; and, in caſe he had married a handſome girl, what would he think of being obliged to deliver her to a ſtout, clever young fellow, who would generate ſtronger and handſomer children than himſelf? Would he not like better, that law where a man begets his own children, as is the law of Moſes?

How would he like, if he had children, to be obliged to bring them before *the venerable men of the city*, to examine if they had a crooked noſe or a crooked leg, and, in that caſe, to be caſt down a precipiece to be no more? And, if found ſound and ſtraight, to be obliged to ſuffer them, in their youth, to be flogged on Diana's altar, in the moſt cruel manner, and to ſee them there ſometimes expire under the laſh? Would he not rather like to ſave his children, however deformed, and to live under a law where ſuch barbarities were puniſhed with death?

How

How would he like, if he had ſaved out of his eſtate, a piece of dry bread, as a dainty, or a ragged cloak to cover himſelf, that another man ſhould pilfer it ſlyly away, and be commended for it, and he to be laught at in the bargain? Would he not rather prefer a law where the thief is puniſhed and obliged to pay two for one? And in caſe his misfortune had been to be a poor innocent ſlave, how would he reliſh the *criptæ*? How would he like to be murdered in cold blood? Would he not rather be a ſlave under a law, ſo tender as that which declares, that a ſlave ſhall get his freedom, only, for *looſing a tooth* by a blow from his maſter?

If Voltaire repreſents the Jews as cannibals, and beaſtial people, becauſe he loſt ſome money with a poor Jew, what would he make of the Switzers (in caſe it ſhould be poſſible that they could be ſo ſenſeleſs as to turn Lacedemonians,) who would not only ſtrip him of all his property, reſtrict him to an abominable diet, oblige him to ſuffer now

and

and then a ſevere flagelation, make him walk without ſhoes, and bare-legged in his youth; and, when married, to take his wife and give her to an handſomer fellow, and compel him to murder his children if their features were not regular; and all this, to make him and all the people fit to deſtroy their neighbours; would ſuch laws then, and ſuch a people deſerve his commendation? What would his learning avail him in ſuch a country? He would only be deſpiſed, if not murdered for being a uſeleſs fellow to the ſtate.

But you will ſay the queſtion is not whether ſuch laws are agreeable to Mr. Voltaire, but whether they are good or bad; but what goodneſs can they promote? No other than to make men *ignorant*, to make women *lewd*, to make the children wretched, to make them *fierce*, and bring all of them to the greateſt evil, *the deſtruction of mankind*; laws which only would be fitted for *tygers and other wild beaſts*.

The Spartans themſelves were ſo convinced of the futility and impracticability of thoſe laws,

laws, that when Agis, the ſon of Endamidas, pretended to reſtore them, being already aboliſhed in his time, he was ordered by the Ephory *to be ſtrangled for his raſhneſs*, that is the notion they had of the ſeverity of thoſe laws, fit only to be given by a barbarian, to a barbarous people, rather than by a God to civiliſed men.

SECTION XXIX.

Of the EARLY CIVILIZATION *of the* JEWS.

THE unbelievers, when they want reaſon, take hold of calumnies; ſo Mr. Voltaire as he was fully reſolved to make the Jews barbarians, and their laws as barbarous, was obliged to invent, that the Jews were cannibals, a beaſtial people, and a nation which ordered human ſacrifices; when all that he can find in the law, is only, that God devoted to deſtruction the nations who were guilty of thoſe abominations; thoſe the Jews did not ſacrifice, but put to death.

The

The law does not ſay, all that is devoted to deſtruction of men ſhall be ſacrificed; but *ſhall be put to death*, (LEVIT. 27) and, if devoted to deſtruction, is ſacrificing, as Voltaire pretends, All towns which have been taken ſword in hand, were ſo many human ſacrifices: How many of theſe were not offered in the time of the Cruſades, in the Scicilian veſpers, and in the maſſacre of St. Bartholomew? But, in truth, there have been no human ſacrifices but among the heathens antiently; and if any were, that has any appearance of ſuch, in modern times, there are only to be found among the inquiſitors, for they burned the Jews as an *act of faith*, with *proceſſions*, and Halelellujahs.

Whether Jephtah ſacrificed his daughter or not is of no ſignification; Jephtah, according to the Rabbies, was a ſuperſtitious ignorant man, though a brave ſoldier; for his raſh vow, could never have been lawfully performed, for if even a dog or a horſe had been the firſt thing that had appeared before him,

him, it was againſt the law to ſacrifice it, and much more a human creature; and, if he did it, it was like ſome of the Kings of Iſrael who were idolaters, which does not prove that the law ſanctifies idolatry.

The Jews being then, fully acquitted of the execrable calumnies of thoſe infidels, let us examine, as ſhortly as poſſible, the excellency of their laws; we ſhall only quote a few, and that in general terms, becauſe to be particular would require a great volume.

The firſt law was to increaſe and multiply, to propagate their own kind, which was neceſſary to people the world; therefore Sodomy was puniſhed with death, which neither Solon nor Lycurgus forbad.

Even that encreaſing ſhould not be in the promiſcuous manner of the nations, which cauſing only confuſion in the generations, could not, by conſequence, contribute to the love and tenderneſs of the parents, but in a regular and orderly manner, that every man ſhould have a *poſitive ſanction* of his

children; therefore adultery was punished with death, *Polygamy and Divorce facilitated*, that a man by being tied for life to a wife he should not like, and not permitted to marry another, should not commit adultery, or violate a virgin, as is often the case.

Where can you find better laws, in regard to the duty of a man to God, to the King, to his judges, to his parents, to his children, to his neighbours, to strangers, to servants, and more charitable to the poor than those of Moses? Even the most proper laws from a man to his foes.

"If thou meet, (says the law) thine ene-
"my's ox, or his ass going astray, thou shalt
"surely bring it back again to him; if thou
"see the ass of him that hateth thee, lying
"under his burden, shouldest thou forbear
"to help him? Thou shalt surely help
"him:" (Exod. 23) Those were not natural laws, for every man will more naturally distress his enemies than help them, but they are wise, good, and necessary laws.

These

Theſe were the only laws through the whole globe, that commanded to worſhip alone the inviſible God, creator of the heavens and earth, and no other beſides him. This is the law which defines God by his eſſence, his exiſtence, his unity, his goodneſs, his providence and his eternity in one word. God ordering Moſes to tell the children of Iſrael, I SHALL BE *ſent me unto you*, אהיה I SHALL BE. Every creature may ſay, *I am* or *I was*, but God only may call himſelf by I SHALL BE, becauſe HE only can aſcertain that HE SHALL BE; for אהיה אשר אהיה is not, as it is commonly tranſlated, *I am that I am*, which is neither ſenſe nor grammar, but I SHALL BE, BECAUSE I SHALL BE; and that the children of Iſrael ſhould not be miſled, thinking that by God calling himſelf I SHALL BE, that he is not, or was not, with them; he declared to Moſes his wonderful and ineffable name, יהוה that *holy four* which Pythagoras took from the Jews, which in four letters, (the YOD ſerving for the third perſon ſingular of the future, he

ſhall; and OVE, and AVA, the two ways it can be read, for the preſent and the preterite) clearly ſpecifies, HE THAT SHALL BE, THAT IS, AND THAT WAS. Amazing and adorable name; which includes his *eſſence*; his *unity*, his *goodneſs* and *providence* of being and aſſiſting his creatures, and his *eternal exiſtence*; *a parte ante* and *a parte poſt*, without beginning and without end; a name of ſo ſublime a ſignification, which not only cannot be found in any language, in one word, but is almoſt impoſſible for any man to have invented, if God himſelf had not revealed it.

Now if the Jews were only a barbarous people, and all the nations around them civilized, where have they found thoſe laws? Not from thoſe nations, for all were idolaters: The Egyptians, where they came from, worſhipped animals, inſects, and even onions: The Phœnicians or Canaanites, where they were going, worſhipped Saturn, or Molech, Jupiter, Venus, and Adonis, and even burnt their children to their idols. Does not Moſes expreſſly ſay to the children of Iſrael,

" After

" After the doings of the land of Egypt " wherein you dwelt, ſhall ye not do, and " after the doings of the land of Ca- " naan, whither I bring you ſhall ye not " do, neither ſhall ye walk in their ordi- " nances, &c." LEV. 18, verſe 3. How was it then poſſible that Moſes, as ſome of the aforeſaid philoſophers pretend, ſhould have learned his laws from thoſe nations?

Then if the Jews were ſuch barbarians, as theſe philoſophers chuſe to make them, and the reſt of the nations ſo civilized, that theſe could only teach them, and the Jews had only better laws; theſe laws muſt certainly have been revealed to them, for the former could not have had abilities to compoſe them, nor any of their neighbours been in poſſeſſion of them.

Thus the partiality of thoſe philoſophers blinded them ſo far, that their own calumnies deſtroy their own opinions.

But by whatever name Voltaire and others may call the Jews, they muſt allow them to have been maſters of ſeveral arts, before the

the Romans exiſted; and even before the Grecians knew how to bake bread; nay, even before they or their gods were born. Theſe ſeveral arts, were employed in the tabernacle, where there were maſons, carpenters, tanners, weavers, embroiderers, gold and ſilver ſmiths, ſetters of jewels, &c. &c. conſequently the Jews were only a barbarous nation, in the barbarous jargon of thoſe pretended philoſophers.

Is there any thing comparable among all the poets, ancient or modern, in eloquence, beauty, and elevation of thought, to the two ſongs of Moſes? Is there any hiſtory related with more *pathos* than that of Joſeph? What is there more forcible, and wrote with more energy, than the exhortations of Moſes? Does not even Longinus admire as the nonplus of ſublimity, the expreſſion of Moſes, *and God*, or rather the Almighty, (which is the propereſt tranſlation of אלהים) *ſaid, let light* BE, *and light* WAS? Are theſe the productions of barbarians? Add to theſe the expreſſive and beautiful ſong of Deborah, the pſalms

of

of David, the prayer, proverbs, ſongs, and eccleſiaſtes of Solomon, the fine allegories, tropes, and figures of Iſaiah, the pathetic declamations of the lamentations of Jeremiah, the ſublimity of the book of Job, &c. and any man who is not voluntarily blind muſt be convinced that not only the five books of Moſes, but the whole bible, was the production of a civilized and wiſe nation. Did not the Grecians learn even their *alphabet* from the Hebrews? Is not this an evident proof thereof, that the names of their letters have only a meaning in Hebrew, and not in Greek?

Was not the Engliſh, the moſt civilized nation at preſent in the world, chiefly civilized by the bible? Is not, even now, the bible uſed in all their ſchools to inſtruct their children? And would the wiſeſt, the moſt learned and civilized nation, and all thoſe who are not barbarous, inſtruct their children, by a book preſented to them by barbarians?

Thus

Thus, the Pentateuch was not "preſented "to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, "corroborated by no concurring teſtimo-"nies," as David Hume pleaſes to ſay, but by the moſt civilized nation then in the world; and corroborated by a ſucceſſion of innumerable teſtimonies of friends and foes, as we ſhall ſhew in the following ſection;

SECTION XXX.

Of the TESTIMONIES *of the* JEWISH LAWS, *the accompliſhment of* PROPHECIES *and of* MIRACLES.

THE authenticity of the Jewiſh laws was confirmed from generation to generation; and the truth thereof corroborated by ſo many ſucceſſive teſtimonies of different beliefs and perſuaſions, by Moſes and three millions of people, by Joſhua, and, from him, by the judges, by David and Solomon in the building of the firſt temple, by all the prophets till Eſra, in the building of the ſecond temple, and ſince confirmed by the Samaritans,

tans, by the Jews who reſided from time immemorial in Cochin, and had no communication with the other Jews till the Dutch traded there; by thoſe of Spain and Portugal, who were carried there, by the Babylonians after the deſtruction of the firſt temple, and never mixed with any of the other Jews till this day.* By the Maccabees, by the Apoſtles, by Joſephus, by the author of the Miſna, (who lived in the time of Antoninus Pius) by the fathers of the church both ſyſtematic and orthodox, even by ſeveral Pagans, and after by the Talmud, by the

* When the Jews were acquainted that a great congregation of Jews was in Spain, chiefly in Toledo, called by them Tolitula, to aſcertain the truth of it they wrote to them the following words: *Hear O Iſrael the Lord is our God, the Lord is one*, to which thoſe of Spain anſwered that elegant profeſſion of faith called *Emet veyatzib*, wrote in the pureſt Hebrew, and ſo much approved by the Jews that they inſerted it in their morning ſervice between their chief prayers the *Semang* and the Hamida. The prophet Obadiah, Ch. 1, Verſe 20, ſpeaks of "the captivity of Jeruſalem, which is in *Sepharad*," that is *Spain*, as can be proved by the antient tradition of the Jews, and the name the Spaniſh Jews bear to this day, of which the Grecians, to bring the word to their own language, according to cuſtom, coined the name *Heſperides*.

Caraites, by the Koran, by Maimonides, and many millions of Jews, Chriſtians and Muſſelmen, ~~ſucceſſively~~ after ~~ſucceſſion~~, that it is impoſſible to find in nature a ~~progreſſion~~ of greater teſtimonies.

The prediction of Moſes, of the conſervation of the Jews, their captivity, their ſufferings, their diſperſion, their contemptible ſituation among the nations, and their preſervation is ſo clear; that of Iſaiah naming Cyrus by his own name, and that of Daniel, which wants nothing but to mention Alexander's name, and the name of his ſucceſſors, that philoſophers muſt be voluntarily blind not to ſee it, and nothing is more difficult (as Monteſquieu ſays, before thoſe fine and true words he put into the mouth of that unhappy Jeweſs,) than to prove "*that it is day when the ſun ſhines*, for it is diſputing againſt the will of thoſe who deny it, not againſt their underſtanding."

But the philoſophers have exerted their greateſt ſtrength againſt *miracles*, and their poſſibility. "There

"There can be no miracle," ſays Voltaire; "a miracle is a breach of the *mathematical*, "*divine*, *immutable*, *eternal laws of nature*: "Now, this definition alone makes a mi-"racle a *contradiction in terms*. A law can-"not be both immutable and broken; to "ſuppoſe" ſays he, (with his uſual boldneſs and infidelity) "God works a miracle, is, "if men can inſult God, *a downright inſult* "*to him*, it is no leſs than ſaying to him, "you are *a weak and inconſtant being*:"

But is, *even*, *a man*, to be called weak and inconſtant, by changing his actions according to the different motives, circumſtances, and reaſons? No; rather if he ſhould act in the ſame manner always, without regarding reaſons, circumſtances, or motives, he would be a MADMAN.

Is it not an inſult to God to make him ſubject to laws? To make him act by neceſſity? If God cannot do thoſe things which are not contradictory, where is his omnipotence? Beſides, a Law that will ſubject God, muſt be of his own making; and why ſhould

God deprive himſelf, as we have ſaid, *Section Nine*, of his moſt perfect attribute, that of his liberty? That God is not free to act, only a madman can aſſert, and by conſequence only ſuch an one can ſay that God cannot perform a miracle.

But what is a miracle elſe but the *will of God*, who, for reaſons only known to himſelf, changes and alters things as he thinks right; to-day he finds it right that the ſun ſhall move from eaſt to weſt, or the earth from weſt to eaſt, and, he may find it equally right, that, at any other time, it ſhall move in the contrary order, or not move at all; to-day he found it right to create the world, and, at the ſame time, he might have found it as right at any time after, to annihilate it; for immutable laws, to bind God, we have ſhewn already, in *Section Nine*, to be a philoſophic abſurdity.

Section XXXI.

Of Theism *and* Providence.

We have ſhewn, *Section Twenty-one*, the neceſſity of revelation, which evidently

evidently muſt prove God's Providence, for one cannot exiſt without the other; or rather the firſt is the conſequence of the latter; but the philoſophers who prove neceſſity from the foreſight of God, are ſo ſtupid as to inſiſt that God has no ſight.

"We ought not" (ſays one of them) "attribute to the cauſe more than what we "can find in the effects; from the wonderful works of God we are not only convinced of his exiſtence, but of his omniſcience, his omnipotence, and his goodneſs; but how can we prove his providence, when we ſee ſo many diſorders in "this world."

But if the effect is a neceſſary conſequence of the cauſe, we muſt allow it, tho' we cannot diſcover it; now if God ſhould have abandoned this world after he had created it, if he ſhould not provide for its continuance and preſervation, where would be his goodneſs; If he ſhould not ſee, nor hear, nor have knowledge of things, where would be his wiſdom? If he is immenſe he muſt be

every

every where; if he is every where and does not ſee our actions, does not hear our prayers, nor provides for us, what is the difference between the true God and the images of the Gentiles? Of theſe, ſays David, "*they have eyes and do not ſee, they have ears* "*and do not hear, &c.*" they have no wiſdom, and conſequently do not know; but the Deiſts, more abſurdly, not only aſſert that God does not ſee nor hear, but that having underſtanding, and knowing every thing, he does not know, which is a contradiction.

Beſides, the lot of the wicked and of the good, of him who murders a man, and of him who ſaves a life, of him who worſhips his creator, and of him who blaſphemes at him, would be alike; which, though it might be to the intereſt of the Atheiſt or Deiſt to believe, is inconſiſtent with the juſtice of God, and conſequently with his wiſdom and goodneſs; but as thoſe philoſophers cannot deny that God muſt be juſt, not being able to comprehend how juſtice is performed in this world, not believing in a future

future ſtate, they affirm that God does not know, nor ſee our wants, nor attend to our prayers, and make God to us of leſs benefit than a block of wood, which may yet ſerve to ſome good purpoſe; but this philoſophic God, being of infinite goodneſs, according to their ſyſtem, is of no good at all to us.

The juſtice of God is not to be weighed in the ſcale of mens underſtanding, what appears to us an injuſtice, might be, in the eyes of God, very juſt; what appears to us an evil, is many a time the greateſt good; God might conſent to the deſtruction of one *man* to ſave many lives which he might have foreſeen *that* man would have taken away; and as his providence muſt be a neceſſary conſequence of his omnipotence, his infinite wiſdom and goodneſs, and thoſe of his juſtice, otherwiſe he could not be God, we muſt acknowledge his juſtice and his providence, to be not only univerſal but even particular, which attends every man, and if that juſtice cannot be found in this world, as his infinite

goodneſs,

goodneſs, wiſdom, and power, cannot be denied, we muſt neceſſarily believe in a future ſtate, where that juſtice muſt and ought to be fulfilled; I will ſay no more on this ſubject, having largely wrote upon it in my Hebrew Epic Poem, in imitation of Job, intitled *Mikré kol atemany vehaziel aſophe anahamaty*.

But poſſibly Unbelievers may ſay, that, if God has both an univerſal and particular Providence, it thence follows, that no great revolutions could happen independent of his Providence: Therefore, the Jewiſh, Chriſtian and Mahometan Religions, THE GREATEST REVOLUTIONS UPON RECORD, muſt have been the effect of his Providence.—But, this is inconſiſtent! Becauſe all theſe DIFFERENT RELIGIONS, had they been the diſpenſations of God's Providence, muſt neceſſarily have been approved of by him, which involves a contradiction and appears abſurd.

This ſeemingly ſtrong argument, not yet ſolved by any body, I will endeavour to an-

ſwer, firſt, inſiſting upon a ſhort digreſſion neceſſary to my future reaſoning, which, together with my anſwer, are ſubmitted to the conſideration of every candid reader.

SECTION XXXII.

Of the CHIEF DUTY *of a good* MINISTER *and true* PHILOSOPHER.

THE duty of all wiſe and good men whom God has pleaſed to put at the head of a nation, to inſtruct mankind, is, after propagating in them the knowledge of God and his worſhip, to inſtill into them that virtue without which no religion can ſubſiſt, that is HUMANITY; without it all religion is a mockery, and philoſophy but a dreſſed barbarity; if religion is a bond which binds the individuals of each nation in particular, humanity goes farther, by tying and uniting together the individuals of all. We ought to bring men as near to one another as poſſible, to procreate in them univerſal love, tenderneſs, and humanity, and not hatred and

malevolence; we ought to deſtroy natural antipathies and human prejudices, and to believe that *all men, who with ſincerity travel towards God and ſalvation, will arrive at the ſame point, though they ſhould take different roads*; that God is neither Briton, Franc, Hebrew, Turk or Indian; that he has created all men, and is willing to ſave them all.

The truth of this might be proved by ſeveral texts of the holy bible, and even by the Rabbins. King David ſays that "*the mercy of God is upon all his works,*" PSALM 145, verſe 9; and God ſays by the prophet Malachy, Ch. 1, verſe 11, "From the riſing of "the ſun unto the going down of the ſame, "my name IS § great among the Gentiles, "and in every place incenſe IS offered unto "my name, and a pure offering, for my "name IS great among the Heathens, ſays "the Lord of Hoſts:" Theſe are the words of God, according to the tranſlation of the Hebrew; and if God ſays this of the Ido-

§ Not SHALL BE as in the Engliſh tranſlation of the Bible.

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laters and Heathens, becauſe, though they miſapplied their worſhip, they looked for the true God in their Idols, how much greater then muſt the name of God be among thoſe who have abandoned Idolatry, and have acquired a truer notion of the Divine Being? *Any good man, of whatever nation he is, is ſaved,* according to the doctrine of our Rabbins—God would not create the whole world toſave only a few of ſome particular religion, and deſtroy the reſt.

The Jews are not only ordered to love one another, but *to love ſtrangers, for they were ſtrangers in the land of Egypt,* Deut. Ch. 10, v. 19; the ſpirit of the Evangeliſts is love and kindneſs to all men; and in this, after the love of God, they conſtitute the whole law; the hoſpitality of the Muſſulmen is celebrated through the whole world; thoſe are the chief points and baſis of all religions, and thus far they approach one another; and will tend to ſave all thoſe who obſerve them.

After eſtabliſhing this hypotheſis, let us now go to the ſolution of our argument, and

examine if all the aforeſaid great revolutions were led or not by the hand of Providence, for which purpoſe, I ſhall only relate ſome facts, and leave every man to decide for himſelf.

SECTION XXXIII.

Of the JEWISH, CHRISTIAN, & MAHOMETAN RELIGIONS, *if all could be led by* PROVIDENCE.

WE have ſhewn, *Sections twenty-four and twenty-five*, the ſpirit of the Jewiſh religion, and that their ceremonies in the written law, and thoſe even inforced by the Rabbins; *are of abſolute neceſſity to us*, not only to ſave ourſelves, but by conſerving us, to be an evident teſtimony to all nations, an eye ſore to Atheiſts, Theiſts and unbelievers; and, by confirming the world in the true knowledge of God and his power, to ſave all mankind.

It is evident alſo, that God has not only revealed his knowledge to the Jews, but through

through Adam or Noah, to the whole world; in the time of Abraham there was among the nations a Malchiſedec, and in the time of Moſes there was a Bilham who proclaimed the ſame. We find a Zoroaſter or Zerduſt among the Perſians; a Confucius among the Chineſe; a Brama among the Indians; an Anaxagoras, and a Socrates among the Grecians; and many among the Romans who teached the ſame truth; at laſt by the conqueſt of the Jews, by Pompey, the Romans who conquered almoſt all the world then known, and admitted the Gods of every nation, received alſo the God of the Jews, by the name of the *unknown God*.

The apoſtles came afterwards who, being Jews, could not believe but in the God of Iſrael, and preached the ſame God to the Gentiles; but the Gentiles being yet too much addicted to idolatry could not leave off the worſhip of their idols, and ſo but few were converted, until ſome of the fathers afterwards tranferred the adoration of their Gods

Gods and Godeſſes, in that of he and ſhe ſaints in the time of Irene and Conſtantine, this brought a great many nations into the knowledge of God, mixed with the worſhip of images.

Learning making a great progreſs in the eaſt, in the time of Mahomet and the Caliphs brought them to reject all images, and to proclaim the *unity* of that God found in the Jewiſh laws; the weſt, and chiefly the north, were in the utmoſt ſtate of ignorance and barbarism, and retained the worſhip of images; by which means they brought in the Idolaters to the belief of God, mixed with their own cuſtoms. Learning increaſing in the weſt, a Luther ſtarted up, and by a ſtroke of his pen, eraſed the worſhip of images; and Calvin after him, baniſhed them from all the Proteſtant churches.

Servetus (poor Servetus) the firſt martyr among the Chriſtians for the *unity* of God, lived at the ſame time; Nicolas Antony was alſo executed for ſaying he believed in the great

great God of Iſrael, and Socinus who being happier, converted many men to that belief. The true philoſophers who came after, a Newton, a Clarke, a Locke, &c. believed, we think, the ſame; and, according to the *Encyclopedia*, many of the clergy of Geneva are Philoſophers and Socinians.—Quere? Would it be a great abſurdity to ſuppoſe that in other countries Philoſophers in general will be Unitarians? At laſt we find by a letter to the Reverend Mr. Lindſey, wrote to him by his friend (publiſhed in the London Magazine) when he reſigned a preferment in the church for being an Unitarian, accuſing the Chriſtians of *Politheiſm*, "that he was in the *wrong*, for infinite power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, are the three perſons and one God;" and if by the three perſons we are only to underſtand the three chief attributes which conſtitute the eſſence of one God, we are all Unitarians.

Only the common people among the Spaniards and Portugueſe remain until this day the moſt addicted to the adoration of their

their images; but they were diſpoſed by Providence to conquer the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, and muſt have brought the Indians by the ſame gradation to the true knowledge of God; they begin to be wiſer, the holy bible is permitted to be tranſlated among them, and themſelves and their Indians will be, in time, as clear ſighted as the reſt of the world: Then ſhall come that happy day, that through the whole earth, "the Lord ſhall be *one* and his name *one*." Zac. c. 14, v. 9.

I leave now, to every man to judge, if in all theſe tranſactions, they can ſee or not the hand of Providence, who will *lead* men, but *not force* (for where there is force, there is no merit) to the adoration of his holy name, and by conſequence to everlaſting ſalvation, and, if thoſe impious infidels among the Jews, who hold religion in contempt, do not revolt againſt Providence, and the ſalvation of the world.

SECTION

SECTION XXXIV.

Of a FUTURE STATE *and* RESURRECTION.

THAT there will be a future ſtate, philoſophers muſt allow, as a conſequence of the juſtice of God; for as they did not find that juſtice performed in this world, it muſt be performed in another, either by *reſurrection*, that is by inſpiring matter with the ſame life again, or by the pain and pleaſure that the *ſoul* muſt feel after ſeparation; and both, we will prove, are agreeable to reaſon; and we defy any philoſopher to ſhew not only the impoſſibility, but even the leaſt improbability in ſuch a *pleaſing, beneficial, and neceſſary belief*.

We have proved, *Section fourteen*, that pain and pleaſure are chiefly in the ſoul, and not in the body, and by conſequence it is very reaſonable to believe, that the ſoul ſhall not loſe its own properties by being ſeparated from thoſe of the body; as to reſurrection, the philoſophers who believe we have

no ſoul, becauſe it is not impoſſible for God to make matter think, ought, by the ſame way of reaſoning, to believe reſurrection; not only becauſe it is not impoſſible to God to inſpire the ſame matter with the ſame life again, but becauſe reſurrection, (as the great Locke ſays) is a leſſer wonder than generation; and as one of the Rabbins expreſſes himſelf, "it is eaſier to conceive and under-"ſtand, that what exiſted before, ſhould "exiſt again; than that which never exiſt-"ed, ſhould have a being."

But a future ſtate, ſay thoſe philoſophers, is not revealed in the laws of Moſes: What then? If there is to be a future ſtate, as there muſt be by the reaſon aforeſaid, the ſilence of Moſes can prove nothing againſt it.

The belief of a future ſtate was an univerſal belief among all the nations, and a conſequence of the belief of a Deity, either true or falſe, and of his juſtice, and the Jews who have brought it down to us from generation to generation, muſt have neceſſarily believed

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it as a conſequence of their believing in God and his juſtice; but as things at a great diſtance, make very little impreſſion on men, and as men, to be terrified from their wickedneſs would require to be threatened *with greater puniſhments than thoſe which are conſiſtent with the mercy of God in a future eternal life.* Therefore, the laws of Moſes are not enforced, but by the puniſhments in this world, the future ſtate is only hinted at; as when Moſes ſays that the *Lord ſhall judge his people,* Deut. chap. XXXII, verſe XXXVI *that he puts to death and brings to life again.* Ibid v. 39.—and as it is more fully explained in Samuel, *he puts to death and brings to life again, brings down to the grave and raiſes them up.* Sam 1, 2, v. 6, and Solomon ſays, *that the duſt ſhall return to the earth where it came from, and the ſpirit ſhall return to God, who gave it; and that God will bring every work in judgment with every ſecret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.* Eccle.

But our philoſophers, not ſatisfied with thoſe general terms, though they believe not

in future rewards and puniſhments, would expect to find in Moſes and the prophets, ſome more particular deſcription of a future ſtate.

But what ſhould Moſes ſay? Should he, *ad terrorem*, deſcribe the *Tartarus*, or the *Elyſian Fields* of the Poets? Or the *Mahometan's Paradiſe*, and a Hell, with ugly demons, having rough beards, horrid claws, and long tails, created on purpoſe to blaſpheme God, and to be employed in roaſting ſouls? This would certainly put terror in vulgar minds. But could any of thoſe philoſophers believe that Moſes or the prophets were inſpired by God, for inculcating in the people ſuch notions? Certainly not. Does it not rather prove the inſpiration of Moſes (ſince the whole world was, in his time, long after, and is even now, full of abſurd notions in regard to a future ſtate), that he did not explain the nature of future rewards and puniſhments to his people?

The idea of future puniſhments and rewards; ſpiritual pain and pleaſure; which we ought

ought to believe and expect, is ſo ſublime and exalted a thing, that it is even difficult to be conceived by the greateſt men; for as the prophet Iſaiah rightly ſays, Chap. 64, v. 4, "Men have not heard, nor perceived by the ear, neither hath the eye ſeen, O God, beſides thee, what he hath prepared for him, that waiteth for him," which proves, not only, that the Jews had the ſublimeſt notions of future rewards, long before Chriſt, but that it is impoſſible for any human being to be truly acquainted with the manner of them!

The extreme joy of a good conſcience, and the excruciating pains of a bad one, in a pure mind, cannot be conceived, but as a ſhadow, even by men of ſenſe; the exceſſive grief or ſatisfaction of the mind, ſurpaſſing the moſt violent pains, or the greateſt enjoyments of the body, as we call them, cannot make impreſſion upon weak and fooliſh men: To tell them that a ſoul may burn without actual fire, for pain and pleaſure are no more than ideas fixed in the ſoul, as we often

feel

feel that we burn in a dream, and, likewiſe, that we enjoy great pleaſure, without other reality exiſting than the idea, and conſequently *God, to puniſh or reward a ſoul, has only to fix the idea of pain or pleaſure in it*; to tell this, would hardly be conceived by them, and have made very little impreſſion on vulgar minds; therefore Moſes threatened them with corporal pains in this world, as fitter to be conceived, and to make greater force upon men who were no Philoſophers.

Notwithſtanding (as I have ſhown in my Saphnot Pangneag, in Hebrew and French) every ſenſible man, by reflecting, how grievous, even in this world, when the ſoul animates the body, the troubles and anxieties of the mind are above the pains he feels in the body, he will have a ſhadow of the horrors of a mind ſet at liberty, when ſhe is really conſcious of having offended a powerful, a gracious, a benevolent, and a merciful God, when all her perfidy, her blaſphemies, her wickedneſs, her hypocriſy, her impiety,

piety, her cruelty and ingratitude, will not, in part and by ſucceſſion, but all at once with every circumſtance, for ever prey on her, when ſhe ſhall find herſelf unworthy of the favours beſtowed upon her, by that gracious and good God, whom, then ſhe will truly conceive and be amazed, truly know and be caſt down; and can there be, as we have ſaid, *Section Twenty-Two*, if there were no other, a greater Hell, a greater puniſhment? And what if ſome ſhould eternally be troubled with thoſe terrible ideas, as thoſe, who are even in their lives, tormented with that wretched infirmity called the *horrors?* But as even theſe kind of pains cannot be conceived by every man, and the truly ſpiritual ones by no man; Moſes only terrified them with ideas of corporal puniſhment in the preſent ſtate, which, in the generality of men, produces a greater effect.

The hope of a future ſtate, is the *greateſt comfort* a good man can have in this miſerable and wretched life, it is that, which will help him to bear with reſignation his miſfortunes

tunes, his loſſes, his ſickneſs;—even death will appear trifling to him, when he is aſſured that it is only the means of tranſlating him to the enjoyment of a better, a glorious, and an eternal life; no affliction will ever bring him to deſpair; his deſires are few, and his will has ſubmitted to the viciſſitudes of the world,—his conſcience is clear,—he is convinced of the juſtice of God, he does not doubt of his goodneſs, and is certain that God would not have created him to deſtroy him; he knows the difference between himſelf and his dog, and cannot believe that both ſhall periſh alike; and if it were poſſible that there ſhould be no future ſtate, he has loſt nothing by his belief, but has got a great deal by the conſolation and happineſs it had contributed to afford him in this life; on the contrary, the unhappy unbeliever, by being void of this hope, has loſt all comfort, got only deſpair and ſorrow *in this world*, and if there is, *as there muſt be*, a *future ſtate*, he makes himſelf alſo unhappy to all eternity *in the next*. Reader, you are at liber-

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ty, you may, or you may not, chuſe, but remember the certainty of this, that if you are the unbeliever, you can never expect to enjoy a life to come, and you run a great riſk of deſtroying yourſelf in the preſent; but if you are a believer, you can never deſtroy yourſelf in the preſent, and you have the greateſt probability of enjoying the future.

SECTION XXXV.

The coming of the MESSIAH, *and* CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ſhewn, I think, the abſurdity, inconſiſtence, and danger of receiving and following the opinions of thoſe, who, under the name of Modern Philoſophers, only inculcate Atheiſm, Deiſm, and irreligion; though, as much miſchief as theſe falſe philoſophers, like *falſe prophets*, have, and will produce in this world; ſo much good, will, and have, the true ones, like the *true prophets*, promoted; theſe will help you,

and have already helped, in publiſhing the true knowledge of God, his *unity* and great wonders in the world; theſe will help you in promoting laws of peace, and extinguiſhing the cruelties of war; in bringing all nations to the knowledge of God, to mutual love and tenderneſs; to their moral duties and the primitive revelation; which are the Noachide laws.

When that bleſſed time ſhall come, *when the Lord ſhall be one, and his name one*, we ſhall all be *one people*; then, and then alone we can expect our load to be lightened; then, as Jeremiah ſays, and our Rabbins declare, you ſhall not remember the coming out of Egypt, but the deliverance from this great and long captivity; then you will have no occaſion to conquer your land, they will offer it to you, and help you to build a Temple to the Lord, which will be adored by all men, and reign over all the earth, by his moſt holy and ineffable name; then you will be gathered from your diſperſion, and be

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no more *a bye word and reproach* to all nations, but, as the Prophet ſays, (*Zephaniah, chap.* 3, *v.* 10,) *At that time will I bring you again, and in that time I will gather you, for I will make you* a name, *and* a praiſe *among all people of the earth, &c.* Then all nations will rejoice to ſee *a people,* who has been loaded with commandments, oppreſſed and deſpiſed ſo long, only to be a living teſtimony to them; and to bring them all, not through darkneſs and by mercy, but through light and juſtice to the road of ſalvation, without the Chriſtians being obliged to turn Jews, or the Jews Chriſtians, as Mr. Prieſtly wiſhes,* then will be the time of the firſt coming of the Meſſiah, according to our expectation, which the Chriſtians will call the ſecond, and which, though it will be long, we ought to expect, and it will naturally come to paſs, the world beginning to take a great ſtep

* Though I muſt confeſs that his Chriſtianity is of that kind which denies Chriſt to be the Meſſiah, that is, Chriſt to be Chriſt, and what the Apoſtles relate with regard to his birth.

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towards it, and the word of God muſt be fulfilled, and it will happen, at the time when *the earth will be filled with wiſdom*, as the Prophet ſays; for then, not only to Mr. Prieſtly and a few Philoſophers, but, to the whole world, THE LORD WILL BE ONE, AND HIS NAME ONE. *Zechariah, chap.* 14, *v* 9.

This is, dear friends, all that my little abilities could produce, to promote in you a rational faith, true religion and benevolence to all humankind, to deliver you from the deluſions and fine ſpun ſpeeches of the pretended Philoſophers, and which I will conclude in the ſame manner as the wiſeſt of Kings terminated his philoſophical enquiries, that the beſt philoſophy is, *to fear God and obſerve his commandments, for this is the whole duty of Man.*

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FINIS.